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I. INTRODUCTION
The Advisory Committee that drafted the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure during the 1930s could not have envisioned the explosion
of complex products liability and mass tort litigation that has oc-
curred in the federal courts over the past two to three decades.'
Products liability as it now exists was not conceived until the mid-
sixties, well after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure effected a
"revolution in litigation by broadening the availability of discovery." 2
It is not surprising, then, that application of the Rules of Civil
Procedure to products liability litigation as we now know it often
produces results that are wholly inconsistent with the paramount
goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as articulated in Rule
1: "secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action."
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules empowers the courts to enter
protective orders that limit the dissemination of proprietary infor-
mation produced in discovery.4 These orders have proven to be an
effective means of expediting the discovery process by reducing the
need for time-consuming discovery disputes that are wholly collat-
eral to the underlying issues of the case. Courts can enter protective
orders in products liability cases on a motion by a party or by a
person from whom discovery is sought. Where a protective order
See Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of Civil Actions: Model
Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875; Peckham, The
Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role In Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 770 (1981). In 1985 alone, individuals brought 160,660 civil lawsuits in the
federal district courts. Of those, 29,152 cases were personal injury lawsuits based on diversity
jurisdiction. WANT'S FEDERAL STATE COURT DIRECTORY 135 (1987). Between 1975 and 1985,
the number of products liability suits pending in the federal district courts jumped from
2768 to 22,111. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (107th ed. 1986).
Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (1983).
FED. R. Civ. P. I; see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962).
Protective orders typically limit disclosure of information covered in the order to the
parties involved in the lawsuit and to their experts. They also frequently limit the use of the
information to the same case, requiring its return or destruction at the conclusion of the
litigation. For a more detailed discussion of "umbrella" protective orders of the type fre-
quently used in complex products liability cases, see infra text accompanying :totes 66-73.
See also W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST & OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION 235-37, 311—
15;405-10 (1982) (reproducing protective orders entered in several recent cases).
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has been entered pursuant to stipulation rather than on motion, as
is most frequently the case in the products liability context, great
strides are made toward securing the relatively speedy and inex-
pensive determination of lawSuits.
In addition to furthering Rule I interests, protective orders
protect anyone who must respond to a discovery request, including
plaintiffs, defendants and non-parties, from invasion of their pri-
vacy by other would-be plaintiffs, the public and the press. Under
the rule, the "good cause" requirement for entry of a protective
order is satisfied where the movant is able to show that the material
sought to be protected contains "trade secrets," "confidential re-
search" or "commercial information." The movant who seeks a
protective order must set forth specific examples of the competitive
harm that will be suffered without the order. Defendants in cases
involving mass-marketed consumer goods, in particular, face situ-
ations in which the harm they seek to avoid through a protective
order does not, standing alone, rise to the level of "good cause"
within the meaning of Rule 26(c), 5
 but nonetheless brings the threat
of legitimate business losses. For example, the dissemination of
information about older products may not only spread trade secrets,
but also may damage the reputation of an entire product line. This
occurs regardless of the lack of similarity between new and old
products, particularly through proliferation of the information in
the hands of the organized plaintiffs' bar. With increasing fre-
quency, such defendants find themselves pitted against syndicates
of contingency fee lawyers who have joined together to exchange
information in proceedings then pending or later initiated, 9 self-
proclaimed public interest organizations,' private industry lobby
groups,8
 and the investigative press!'
The number and variety of potential adversaries may make the
ramifications of unfettered dissemination of discovery information
6
 For the text of Rule 26(c), see infra text accompanying note 27.
6 E.g., Association of Trial Lawyers of America, which provides members with research
assistance in handling plaintiffs' medical malpractice and products liability cases.
E.g., Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, Public Citizen Litigation Group, and the Center
for Auto Safety.
E.g., insurance Institute for Highway Safety.
9
 E.g., Sixty Minutes, Prime Time Live, etc. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America
has urged legislative modification of the protective order provisions now contained in federal
and state rules of civil procedure. Legislation that limits the effectiveness of protective orders
was passed in Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (1989). Similar legislation was narrowly
defeated in Maryland and Florida and has been discussed on the federal level. The Texas
Supreme Court, pursuant to its rule making authority, enacted a rule limiting protective
orders in April, 1990.
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overwhelming. A single lawsuit can place enormous amounts of
wholly proprietary information in the hands of a lawyer whose
primary mission in the litigation may be to use that information for
purposes entirely unrelated to preparing the case at hand for trial.
That lawyer may reap tremendous financial and other benefits, such
as referral networks or leads to other information, by enlisting
others in review and republication of proprietary information. To
the extent that such information makes its way into the hands of
adversaries, the producing party will invariably be exposed to ad-
verse publicity that will taint juries in future cases involving the
same or other products.
The uncontrolled dissemination of discovery information
among an ill-defined and untraceable amalgam of adversaries may
also disperse trade secrets and other confidential information. As a
result, the party's privacy interest in that information will forever
be lost. Competitors will then have ready access to the company's
internal decision-making procedures and to other highly sensitive
information. In extraordinary cases, the viability of a product, a
company, or an entire industry may well be jeopardized.'°
Although the interests of products liability defendants in pro-
tecting proprietary information are indisputably valid, they recently
have been vigorously attacked by members of the plaintiffs' bar
seeking the unrestricted sale of discovery information at a profit."
A series of recent decisions, based variously on constitutional, com-
mon law, and statutory theories, perpetuate the false assumption
that somehow there exists a general public "right" of access to
obtain, or a plaintiff's "right" to disseminate, discovery materials
produced in litigation and subject to a valid protective order. Com-
mentators and practitioners once thought that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart debunked this
myth. 12 Despite Seattle Times, however, the trend is to recognize the
right of access and the right to disseminate. This trend, combined
with the procedural impediments to obtaining and enforcing pro-
tective orders, has subverted and left open to considerable doubt
the practical value of the protective order as a meaningful form of
protection for products liability defendants. Although many com-
1 ° As, for example, with the football helmet, the intrauterine device (IUD), and the all-
terrain vehicle.
11
 Legislation introduced in several states would alter the rules through which protective
orders are issued. Court Approved Protective Orders, Why They Are Needed, 57 DEF. COUNS. J.
89, 92 (1990).
12
 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
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mentators seem to have welcomed the trend,' 3 this article argues
against it on the basis that it lacks support in the law, accords
insufficient weight to the legitimate privacy interests of corporate
defendants, and is at odds with the overriding directive of Rule 1.
II. THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL RULES"
Although most discussions of protective orders begin with Rule
26(c), which sets forth the standards for the issuance of such or-
ders,' 5 the more appropriate starting point for analysis is actually
Rule 1, because Rule 1 sets the tone by which all other pertinent
Rules are to be interpreted. 16 As previously noted, Rule 1 instructs
that the Rules shall be construed "to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." Also important is Rule
11, which, significantly, was amended in 1983 as part of a major
revision to the Rules expressly designed to curb expensive litigation
and expand the role of the federal courts in managing discovery.' 7
Rule 11, as amended, applies to all "papers," including formal
discovery responses.' 8 It imposes on the lawyer signing those papers
" See, e.g., Note, Protective Orders and the Use of Discovery Materials Following Seattle Times,
71 MINN. L. REV. 171 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Use of Discovery Materials]; Comment, Mass
Products Liability Litigation: A Proposal for Dissemination of Discovered Material Covered by a
Protective Order, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1137 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Mass Products Liability
Litigation]; Note, Seattle Times v. Rhinehart: Making "Good Cause" a Good Standard for Limits
on Dissemination of Discovered Information, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 547 (1986) [hereinafter Note,
"Good Cause"]; Note, Seattle Times: What Effect on Discovery Sharing?, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1055
(1985) [hereinafter Note, Effect on Discovery Sharing]. But see Marcus, supra note 2 (pre•Seattle
Times article arguing against recognition of broad right of access or dissemination).
14 Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only apply in federal court and many
products liability claims are brought in state court, the Federal Rules may not always be
applicable. The analysis in both cases is similar, however, as most states have adopted discovery
provisions similar to those in the Federal Rules. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE
5.2, at 230 (1985).
" See, e.g., Note, Nonparty Access to Discovery Materials in Federal Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1085 (1981); Note, First Amendment Interests in Trade Secrets, Private Materials, and Confidential
Information; The Use of Protective Orders in Defamation Litigation, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1011 (1984).
For the text of Rule 26(c), see infra text accompanying note 27.
16 See FED. R. Ctv. P. 1. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that the discovery rules
are "subject to the injunction of Rule 1." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979).
" See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983). Also as a result of the 1983
amendments, Rule 26(b)(1) now authorizes courts to limit discovery when the party seeking
discovery has had adequate opportunity to complete discovery, when more convenient means
of discovery are available, or when the discovery sought is unduly burdensome or expensive.
Id. at 172. In addition, Rule 16, after the 1983 amendments, requires courts to enter an
order within 120 days of the filing of the complaint limiting the time in which the parties
must complete discovery. Id. at 168-69.
FED. R. Cry. P. 11.
776	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 31:771
the duty to make "reasonable inquiry" into the facts and law and
certify that such responses are "not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation."' 9 Together, Rules 1 and 11 have
significant bearing on applications for protective orders, and, it is
submitted, on applications for their modification—whether by plain-
tiffs seeking to disseminate or by non-parties claiming a public right
of access.
Rule 26(b) is also fundamental to an understanding of protec-
tive orders because it governs the overall scope of discovery. Rule
26(b) permits a party to obtain discovery regarding "any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action."2° The Rule also allows discovery of information
that will be inadmissible at trial, so long as "the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."21
The Supreme Court has emphasized that full disclosure lies at
the heart of the discovery rules, and that the parties should be able
"to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before trial."22 Rule 26(b) provides a products liability plaintiff,
therefore, with considerable leeway in searching out information in
a corporate defendant's possession for use in proving his or her
claim, opposing any defenses ,raised, and impeaching any wit-
nesses. 23 Because the Rule provides that objections regarding ad-
missibility are not a proper basis for refusing discovery, 24 the de-
fendant's discovery responses customarily combine in an
undifferentiated fashion both admissible and inadmissible infor-
mation. It is precisely because of this wide scope of discovery au-
thorized by Rule 26(b) that Rule 26(c) provides a mechanism for
the issuance of protective orders.25 Indeed, the issue involved with
19 Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (signing of discovery requests, responses, and objec-
tions).
29 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
21 Id.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947); see also United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
23 It has been stated that the pretrial discovery procedures under the Rules sought to
put an end to the "sporting theory of justice," whereby the result of a trial depended on luck
and on counsel's skill and strategy. C. WRIGHT SC A. MILLER, FEDERAL PROCEDURE 18-19
(1970).
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
29 The very broad statement as to the scope of discovery in Rule 26(b) is preceded by
the phrase "[U]nless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules
. . . ." FED. R. Cry. P. 26(b).
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most motions for protective orders "is not whether the [c]ourt is
going to allow a party to embark upon a fishing expedition but
whether the [c]ourt may make the voyage more pleasant for those
who are required to become passengers by the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure."26
Rule 26(c) provides, in pertinent part:
Upon motion by a party . . . , and for good cause shown,
the court . . . may make any order which justice requires
to protect a party . . . from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one
or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be
had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified
terms and conditions, including a designation of the time
or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a
method of discovery other than that selected by the party
seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters
not be inquired into, or that the scope of discovery be
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted
with no one present except persons designated by the
court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened
only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or other
confidential research, development, or commercial infor-
mation not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a desig-
nated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified
documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to
be opened as directed by the court. 27
The express language of Rule 26(c) thus allows substantial restric-
tion or even prohibition of a plaintiff's discovery rights when "jus-
tice" requires. Literally, the Rule permits the court to prohibit or
terminate discovery even where the party from whom discovery is
sought will suffer mere "annoyance" or "embarrassment."
Under Rule 26(c), then, a trial judge has broad discretion to
manage the discovery process in a way that will accommodate both
26
 Twin City Fed. Say, & Loan Ass'n v. American Title Ins. Co., 31 F.R.D. 526,527 (W.D.
Mo. 1962); see also Marcus, supra note 2, at 7 (protective orders have removed some of the
"harsh edges of liberal discovery").
27
 An analogue to Rule 26(c) is Rule 30(d), which authorizes certain limitations on
depositions. See FED. R. Qv. P. 30(d). Rule 26(c) was adopted in 1970 to protect parties and
witnesses from potential abuse of the discovery process. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2036, at 267 (1970). Under the initial Rules, protective orders
only applied to depositions under Rule 30(b). In 1948, Rules 33 and 34 were amended to
allow courts to issue protective orders for interrogatories and requests for admissions. The
1970 amendments, however, established general provisions applicable to all means of discov-
ery. Id. § 2035, at 260.
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the plaintiff's need for full disclosure and the defendant's need to
protect its legitimate right to privacy from harmful and unnecessary
intrusions. The Supreme Court has recognized the extraordinary
potential for abuse inherent in a liberal discovery process,28 and has
urged the lower courts to exercise their discretion under Rule 26(c)
to protect the parties from harmful side effects. 29 The Washington
Supreme Court stated in Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, an opinion
squarely affirmed by the United States Supreme Court:
Implicit in [the] language [of Rule 26(c)] is a recognition
that by requiring a party to submit to the searching in-
quiries of discovery, the courts have required him to give
information about himself which he would otherwise have
no obligation to disclose. A realm of privacy which courts
had previously left undisturbed was now opened.
. . . [T]he effective administration of justice does not
require dissemination beyond that which is needed for
litigation of the case. It was the needs of litigation and
only those needs for which courts adopted this rule and
demanded of the litigant a duty which would not other-
wise be his. For this reason, it is proper that the courts be
slow to subject a civil litigant to any exposure which he
deems offensive, beyond that which serves the purpose of
the rule. 5°
Courts and litigants have also come to rely on the federal courts'
power to issue protective orders under Rule 26(c), especially in
complex products liability litigation, to accomplish the purposes
embodied in Rule 1—to speed up discovery and minimize discovery
disputes.s 1
Rule 26(c)(7), which explicitly sanctions the entry of a protective
order to limit or control disclosure of either a "trade secret" or
28 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (referring
to some discovery tactics as a social cost rather than a benefit).
28 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (district courts should freely exercise
their power to control and restrict discovery where necessary to protect a party from abuse).
See generally J. FR1EDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.15, at 413 (1985)
(noting broad discretion given to trial courts to balance danger of harassment against need
for information under Rule 26(c)).
88 Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226, 236, 654 P.2d 673, 679 (1982), aff'd,
467 U.S. 20 (1984).
3 ' See generally infra text accompanying notes 65-72. Rule 26(c) motions for protective
orders are often brought in response to a Rule 37 motion by the plaintiff to compel discovery.
Rule 37(a) allows the court to enter a protective order upon the denial of a motion to compel
even if the objecting party does not move for a protective order. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
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"other confidential research, development, or commercial infor-
mation," is the section of Rule 26(c) invoked most frequently in the
products liability context. As discussed below, however, the courts
have rigidly construed their working definitions of both "trade se-
crets" and "confidential information," making it extremely difficult
for corporate defendants in products liability suits to satisfy the
"good cause" requirement for the initial issuance of a protective
order.
A. "Trade Secrets" Under Rule 26(c)(7)
Before a court will issue a protective order to protect an alleged
"trade secret" under Rule 26(c)(7), it first must independently verify
that the information sought to be protected actually fits the term's
legal definition. Under the definition set forth in section 757 of the
Restatement of Torts, which has been adopted by a number of courts, 32
a trade secret is "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him
an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it." 33 Comment (b) to section 757 suggests that courts
may consider the following six factors in determining the existence
of a trade secret: the extent to which those outside the business
know the alleged "trade secret;" the number and positions of em-
ployees with knowledge of the "trade secret;" the defendant's rules
and procedures designed to protect the secret; the value of the
"trade secret" to the defendant or his competitors; the effort and
cost of developing the "trade secret;" and the ease or difficulty with
which others could acquire or duplicate the "trade secret." 34
"See, e.g., Turick v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 121 F.R.D. 32, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); DeFord
v. Schmid Prods. Co., 120 F.R.D. 648, 653 (D. Md. 1987); Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme,
94 F.R.D. 27, 28 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 203
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 757 (1939). Section 757 was omitted from the Second
Restatement of Torts because liability for harm caused by unfair and deceptive trade practices
was considered to be more properly the subject of unfair competition and trade regulation.
See 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 1-2 (1977). The section 757 factors, however, continue
to be cited and applied by the courts. See also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 1(4), which contains
an expansive definition of the term.
34
 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 757 comment 13 (1939). Other factors courts may consider
include: whether the information has been released in other cases not subject to the protective
order; whether the information is current; whether the information has been filed with a
governmental agency; and whether disclosure will place the company at a great competitive
disadvantage. See In re Upjohn Antibiotic Cleocin Prod. Liab. Litig., 81 F.R.D. 482, 483 (E.D.
Mich. 1979), aff 'd, 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1981).
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Obtaining a trade secret designation that warrants the issuance
of a protective order poses particular difficulties for the products
liability defendant because the information sought in such cases
rarely falls within this narrowly defined category. Waelde v. Merck,
Sharp & Dohme," a case in which the court declined to issue a
requested order, exemplifies this difficulty. In Waelde, the plaintiff
sought discovery of the Federal Drug Administration "new drug
application" file on the prescription drug Clinoral. The file con-
tained post-marketing reports of adverse reactions, pre-marketing
studies, animal tests, and correspondence on the drug's effects. The
defendant argued that the files contained trade secrets, and that
their disclosure without a protective order would allow competitors
to obtain the file from the FDA and use it to obtain approval of
similar drugs, thus nullifying the trade secret status. In declining
to issue the requested order, the court noted that the case before it
was not one where a competitor was the party seeking the informa-
tion, such as in an antitrust action where there would be a strong
likelihood of actual competitive injury."
Courts generally have presumed that disclosure to a direct
competitor (such as might occur in an antitrust or patent infringe-
ment context) is more harmful than disclosure to a noncompetitor."
Although information is not handed over directly to a competitor
in the products liability context, this presumption ignores the reality
that sensitive information, once disclosed, may make its way over
time into the hands of any number of direct or indirect competitors
and result in similar harm. Making it even more difficult for a
defendant to obtain a "trade secret" designation in a products lia-
bility case, some courts have held that once a product incorporating
the alleged trade secret enters the marketplace, the trade secret is,
a fortiori, made public and consequently lost." Again, the difficulty
faced by the products liability defendant in arguing for "trade
secret" protection under Rule 26(c)(7) is readily apparent.
B. "Confidential Information" Under Rule 26(c)(7)
Information that does not rise to the level of a "trade secret,"
but that is nonetheless "confidential," also may be entitled to pro-
35 94 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
35 Id. at 29-30; see also DeFord, 120 F.R.D. at 653 (products liability action against man-
ufacturer of intrauterine device (IUD)).
" See, e.g., American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 828 F.2d 734,739-41 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(holding burden of proof of establishing trade secrets met in patent infringement suit).
"See, e.g., Midland Ross Corp. v. Sunbeam Equip. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 171,177 (W.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 435 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1970).
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tection under Rule 26(c)(7). Confidential information has been de-
fined as information which, if disclosed, will cause a "clearly defined,
serious injury" to the defendant's business." The following five
criteria, derived from Parsons v. General Motors," are generally cited
as the standard for determining "confidentiality": how many em-
ployees had knowledge of the information or worked on a confi-
dential project; how the defendant maintained the secrecy of the
information;• how the defendant controlled or limited the repro-
duction and circulation of the information; the age of the infor-
mation; and whether any of the information was required to be
reported to the government.'" In Parsons, the court held that pre-
viously conducted rear-end impact crash tests and other informa-
tion relating to the design and manufacture of the fuel system of a
car manufactured by General Motors did not contain confidential
information exempt from discovery.'" The court so held even
though General Motors had submitted affidavits stating that the
information had always been limited to the technical and engineer-
ing staffs within the company, with initial distribution of the reports
limited to only a few selected employees. The court instead focused
on the fact that the information at issue was ten years old.45
The defendant in the typical products liability case often finds
itself in the same position as General Motors in Parsons. The pre-
dicament lies in trying to protect the confidentiality of information
and data pertaining to a product prepared years before the product
was finally assembled, years more before the product allegedly
harmed the plaintiff, and even more years than that before the
issue is presented to the court for resolution. Thus, it is not unusual
for a defendant to advocate the confidentiality of design drawings,
design safety meeting minutes and marketing data generated. dur-
ing the design and manufacturing process ten years before the suit
was filed, seven years before the occurrence of the injury, and three
or four years before the product was even assembled.
While staleness of the information sought to be protected as
"confidential" is not an absolute bar to the issuance of a protective
order,'" it is a factor that must be overcome by a specific showing
" United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 202-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
40 85 F.R.D. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
it Id. at 726.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 605, 606-07 (D.D.C. 1969) (three-year-
old financial information protected).
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of present harm.45
 The courts have emphasized that "speculative"
allegations of injury from the disclosure of dated information are
not sufficient to warrant the issuance of a protective order. 46
 Thus,
just as the defendant in the typical products liability case finds it
difficult to obtain a "trade secret" designation for its proprietary
information, it also faces impediments to protecting that informa-
tion as merely "confidential."
C. The Burden of Proof and the Balancing Test Under Rule 26(c)
As should be clear from the foregoing discussion, 47 courts in-
terpreting Rule 26(c)(7) place the burden squarely on the party
seeking confidentiality to show not only that the information sought
to be protected qualifies either as a trade secret or as confidential
information, but also that "good cause" exists for the entry of a
protective order." Once the moving . party has met these require-
ments, the burden shifts to the other party to establish that discovery
of the information is relevant and necessary to the action."
The initial burden of proof on the defendant, however, is a
heavy one. 5° The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently has rei-
45
 DeFord v. Schmid Prods. Co., 120 F.R.D. 648, 654 (D. Md. 1987). Compare United
States v. American Optical, 39 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (holding outdated information
not deserving of protection) with Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F.
Supp. 866, 891 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (recognizing that even "old business data may be extrapolated
and interpreted to reveal a business's current strategy, strengths and weaknesses" and may
be worthy of protection).
46 DeFord, 120 F.R.D. at 654; see also United States v. International Business Machs.
Corp., 67 F.R.D. at 40, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (sales and profits data 3-15 years old not pro-
tected).
47
 See supra text accompanying notes 31-45 for a discussion of Rule 26(c)(7).
46 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Turick
v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 121 F.R.D. 32, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (mere conclusory allegations in
attorney's affidavit that disclosure in products liability case of materials relevant to defendant's
design processes, sales records, marketing plans, and test protocols and results would hurt
its competitive position in the all-terrain vehicle market held insufficient to establish "good
cause"); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 292 (D. Del. 1985).
49
 Empire of Carolina, Inc. v. Mackie, 108 F.R.D. 323, 326 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
59 See, e.g., Smith v. BIC Corp., 121 F.R,D. 235, 241, 242 (E.D. Pa. 1988), where the
court held that BIC, the manufacturer of disposable, nonrefillable butane lighters, was not
entitled to a protective order to prevent the discovery of design and safety test information
or information regarding other complaints or accidents involving the same product. On
appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the records concerning the design and
safety tests were entitled to protection, but it upheld the portion of the order providing that
the information on prior accidents and complaints could be turned over without limitation.
See Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v.
Employers Ins., 124 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Nev. 1989); John Doe 1-V1 v. Yogi, 110 F.R.D. 629
(D.D.C. 1986); Culligan v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 110 F.R.D. 122, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (en-
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terated, "broad allegations of harm unsubstantiated by specific ex-
amples or articulated reasoning are insufficient to support the entry
of a protective order."" The defendant who seeks a protective order
must therefore set forth specific examples of the harm that will
occur in the absence of the order. 52 Adding further difficulty, courts
have held that the affidavit of an attorney alone is hardly ever
sufficient to establish good cause. 53
Even where "good cause" for the entry of a protective order
has been shown, the entry of the order is always within the trial
court's discretion." Courts customarily apply a "balancing test" by
comparing the burden that will be imposed on the moving party if
the order is not granted with the burden imposed on the party who
requested the discovery if the order is granted.55 Courts recognize
that Tit is not the duty of federal courts to accommodate the public
relations interests of the litigants."56 Thus, in deciding whether
tering only limited protective order relating to post-manufacture testing in all-terrain vehicle
products liability case); Kamp Implement Co. v. J.I. Case Co., 630 F. Supp. 218, 219 (D.
Mont. 1986); Howard v. Galesi, 107 F.R.D. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
51
 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1043 (1987).
52 See, e.g., Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 117 F.R.D. 506, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (mere allegation
in defendant's motion that documents had at all times been maintained as internal proprietary
documents and that they contained valuable confidential technical information generated by
corporate scientists held insufficient to establish good cause).
" See, e.g., In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658, 663 (8th Cir.
1985); Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). But see
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (court considered hearsay
allegations of attorney's affidavits in connection with motion for protective order under Rule
26(c)(7), recognizing that in time the plaintiff could produce nonhearsay affidavits to same
effect).
54
 A motion for protective order has been described as a "disfavored motion." Kiblen v.
Retail Credit Co., 76 F.R.D. 402, 404 (E.D. Wash. 1977).
55 See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
669 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir. 1982); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529
F. Supp, 866, 911-12 (E.D. Pa. 1981). An interesting-
 and unusual application of this balancing
test by a court exercising its discretion in deciding whether to issue a protective order is
Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545 (I 1 th Cir. 1985), a products liability
action against a tampon manufacturer seeking recovery for injuries suffered from toxic shock
syndrome (TSS). The protective order was sought by the Centers for Disease Control, a
nonparty that had been served with a subpoena by a tampon manufacturer seeking to discover
the names and addresses of women who had participated in research on TSS. The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the trial court's exercise of its discretion in holding
that the CDC's interest in keeping its participant's names confidential outweighed the dis-
covery interests of the defendant. See also Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d
556 (7th Cir. 1984).
" th re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D.
34, 40 (C.D. Cal. 1984), In Petroleum Products, the plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy among some
of the world's largest enterprises to raise and stabilize the retail prices of gasoline, affecting
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information is deserving of protection, courts generally place
greater weight on the possibility of tangible monetary damage than
on perceived injury to the reputation or public standing of a cor-
poration. 57
 Far from recognizing the heightened potential for harm
from public intrusion into a defendant's privacy in "high profile"
cases, courts sometimes have tended to deny motions for protective
orders precisely because the general subject matter of the litigation
is of "general public interest." 58
Of particular importance in the products liability context is that
a defendant's contention that a plaintiff desires to share the "fruits"
of discovery with other plaintiffs in related or unrelated cases gen-
erally has not been held to constitute the requisite "good cause" for
the initial issuance of a protective order. 59
 A seminal case in this
area is Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 6° where the court rejected Ford's
assertion that a protective order was justified. Ford based its request
on the fact that the plaintiff's counsel were members of various
associations that collected and distributed information regarding
motor vehicle manufacturers and would use the information only
to foment additional litigation. Although one state court recently
has noted that Patterson may now be of doubtful precedential value
in the wake of Seattle Times,6' most courts have continued to sub-
scribe to the view expressed in Patterson. Courts and commentators
alike have generally tended to approve the practice of information
sharing, especially in products liability cases, as coming within the
aim of the Rules to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action. 62 Whether or not the practice of infor-
the lives of all Americans. Similar claims of potential embarrassment also have routinely been
rejected in products liability cases brought against cigarette companies. See, e.g., Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100
(1984); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 573 (D.N.J. 1985), reu'd on other grounds,
785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
55
 See, e.g., Ericson v. Ford Motor Co., 107 F.R.D. 92, 94 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (declining to
issue protective order covering other consumer complaints and litigation against automobile
manufacturer involving alleged "park and reverse" occurrences where defendant merely
claimed it would suffer embarrassment and harm to reputation); see also Litton Indus., Inc.
v. Lehman Bros., 122 F.R.D. 433, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
'8 See, e.g., In re Texaco, Inc., 84 Bankr, 14, 17-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (no good cause shown
for issuance of protective order in widely-publicized Pennzoil-Texaco shareholders derivative
suit); see also United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421 (W.D.N.Y. 1981)
("Love Canal" toxic waste case).
59 The Manual for Complex Litigation endorses discovery sharing in certain circum-
stances to avoid duplicative efforts. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION if 3.11, (5th ed. 1982).
6° 85 F.R.D. 152 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
"' See Mampe v. Ayerst Labs., 548 A.2d 798, 805 n.13 (D.C. 1988).
64 Patterson, 85 F.R.D. at 154; see also DeFord v. Schmid Prods. Co., 120 F.R.D. 648, 654
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mation selling among the plaintiff's bar is acceptable, most courts
exhibit a reluctance to protect products liability defendants from
the use in future lawsuits of information produced in discovery by
defendants." As a result, these unshielded defendants are often at
a grave disadvantage in trying to make the requisite showing in the
context of a contested motion for a protective order. 64
III. THE "UMBRELLA" PROTECTIVE ORDER
In most complex products liability cases, both confidential and
nonconfidential documents responsive to a plaintiff's discovery re-
(D. Md. 1987); Ramp Implement Co. v. J.1. Case Co., 630 F. Supp. 218, 220 (D. Mont. 1986);
Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579 (D. Cob. 1982); In re Upjohn Antibiotic Cleocin
Prod. Liab. Litig., 81 F.R.D. 482 (E.D. Mich. 1979), af 'd, 664 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1981). But
see Scott v. Monsanto Co., 868 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1989) (entry of protective order restricting
plaintiff's use of materials to present litigation not an abuse of discretion despite inability to
share and compare information with plaititiffs in other products liability cases); Allen v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 122 F.R.D. 580, 582-83 (D. Or. 1988) (manufacturer of CU-67 contraceptive
not entitled to protective order prohibiting plaintiff from disclosing or disseminating title
pages of depositions in other CU-67 lawsuits against manufacturer that covered issues
directly related to plaintiff's case). See generally Mason & Hare, The Use of FRCP 26(c)(7) to
Prevent or Limit the Dissemination of "Internal Documents," 7 J. PROD. LIAR. 1 (1984); Rheingold,
The Development of Litigation Groups, 6 Am., j, TRIAL ADVOC. 1 (1982); Note, Anti-Dissemination
Orders in Product Liability Suits, 5 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 507 (1982).
"See e.g., Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579 (D. Cob. 1982); Waelde v. Merck,
Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D.
152 (W.D. Tex. 1980); Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1980). See
generally Hoenig, Protective Confidentiality Orders, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 5, 1990, at 3, 12 n.52. For a
discussion of information sharing and selling among plaintiffs, see infra text accompanying
notes 241-53.
64 If the court denies a motion for a protective order, or grants it but in a form unsat-
isfactory to the defendant, the defendant cannot appeal it unless it involves exceptional
circumstances that warrant mandamus review, see, e.g., New York v. United States Metals Ref.
Co., 771 F.2d 796, 801 (3d Cir. 1985) (allowing mandamus review where no other path of
appellate review available), or unless it meets the criteria for interlocutory review under
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). Under the Cohen test, a
decision granting or denying a protective order may be appealed only if the protective order
involves: an issue unrelated to the merits of the main dispute; a complete resolution of that
• issue; a right incapable of vindication on appeal from the final judgment; and an important
and unsettled question of controlling law, not merely a question of the proper exercise of
discretion. See In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1981); see also Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1116-17 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043
(1987).
A protective order is not an appealable interlocutory injunction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1) unless it grants or denies all or some of the substantive relief sought by the
parties. Because protective orders resolve discovery issues, this will rarely be the case. See
United States Metals Ref. Co., 771 F.2d at 801. In addition, appellate review of protective order
decisions is limited to the question of whether the issuing court abused its discretion. Gallela
v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir. 1973).
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quest are intermingled in the defendant's files. Moreover, in many
cases, a particular responsive document may contain both confiden-
tial and non-confidential information. To sift through all of the
information and prepare a detailed explanation of the confidential
nature of each document the defendant seeks to protect would, in
such cases, require a vast work effort for many weeks. To undertake
such a task prior to producing the documents would needlessly
delay the document production process." In an effort to adhere to
Rule I and to avoid immersing themselves in such a document-by-
document review, courts in complex products liability cases involv-
ing massive document productions frequently enter "blanket" or
"umbrella" protective orders. 66 More often than not, the parties
stipulate to these orders. 67
An "umbrella" or "blanket" protective order typically permits
the defendant to designate as "confidential" a large volume or entire
class of discovery material. The plaintiff is permitted to challenge
the confidentiality designation, and the burden of showing that the
designated materials are, in fact, confidential rests at all times with
the defendant." Because courts frequently enter umbrella orders
to cover large document productions, the plaintiff who challenges
their confidentiality will be required to identify the specific docu-
ments that do not qualify for protection.69 Umbrella protective or-
ders thus prevent unnecessary delays in discovery that otherwise
would be caused if the parties were required to segregate and
explain the proprietary nature of each and every document alleged
65 See In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 356-57 (11th Cir. 1987);
Tavoulareas v.. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 24, 29 (D.D.C. 1981).
66 It has been observed that complex cases in which protective orders are the norm
already occupy a disproportionate share of the courts' time. See Pollack, Discovery—Its Abuse
and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1978). One trial judge has observed that careful scrutiny of
every document in a complex case would make the judge "a veritable hostage" consigned to
"years of adjudication of the confidentiality of individual documents," Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 878-79 n.18 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
67 In apparent recognition of the general confidentiality of discovery, negotiations relat-
ing to stipulated protective orders normally focus on which protective devices the parties will
use (e.g., limitations on access, separate storage, the designation of persons eligible for access)
rather than on whether there should be an order limiting dissemination. See Marcus, supra
note 2, at 9.
68
 See generally Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros., 122 F.R.D. 433, 435-36 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 121
F.R.D. 264, 268 (M.D.N.C. 1988); see also Alexander Grant, 820 F.2d at 356; Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
69
 For a more extended discussion of the practical operation of stipulated umbrella orders
and challenges to confidentiality designations in such orders, see Marcus, supra note 2, at
18-20.
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to be confidential. They also save the courts from becoming bogged
down in the tedium of endless collateral disputes over discovery,
and enable the parties to proceed expeditiously with preparation
for trial.
The use of umbrella orders in complex litigation has become
commonplace. As at least one court has observed:
[T]he propriety and desirability of protective orders se-
curing the confidentiality of documents containing sensi-
tive commercial information that are the subject of dis-
covery in complex cases is too well established to belabor
here. We are unaware of any case in the past half-dozen
years of even a modicum of complexity where an umbrella
protective order ... has not been agreed to by the parties
and approved by the court."
The Manual for Complex Litigation encourages the use of umbrella
protective orders and even recommends a specific form of order."
Thus, every day, in countless courts throughout the nation, millions
of documents are being produced in reliance on the binding force
of stipulated umbrella protective orders. Yet, despite their wide-
spread use, especially in complex products liability cases, it is be-
coming increasingly unclear whether defendants can continue to
rely upon their sustained validity.
As discussed more fully below, the defendant in a products
liability suit who, along with its lawyer, has complied with a plain-
tiff's discovery request under the protection of a protective order,
may be called upon to duplicate its efforts many times in the future.
This duplication may occur if and when the plaintiff, the plaintiff's
attorney, the plaintiff's expert witnesses, other plaintiff's attorneys,
or any of a number of others, such as the press, seek disclosure of
the same materials and information, for reasons entirely of their
own.
Until recently, it had been widely assumed that the very ration-
ale underlying the provision for the issuance of protective orders
under Rule 26(c) is that the only use of discovery materials sanc-
tioned by the federal rules is for trial preparation in the pending
" Zenith Radio Corp., 529 F. Supp. at 889. But see Waelde v. Marck, Sharpe & Dohme, 94
F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (holding blanket protective orders overbroad and not permitted
by Rule 26(c)). See also Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Drinkhall, 490 A.2d 593 (Del. 1985) (umbrella
order not justified where volume of material sought to be protected not overly voluminous).
71 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, § 21.43 (1982), reprinted in 1 J. MooRE, W.
TAGGART & J. WICKER, ' MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 21.43, at 48-50 (1986).
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case.72
 Protective orders clearly are of little value if the parties
cannot rely on them. Yet, recent cases recognizing a public right of
access and plaintiff's right to disseminate discovery information
subject to protective orders—particularly stipulated umbrella or-
ders—may portend the very demise of such orders.
As discussed more fully below, the trend in these recent cases
threatens to clog the courts with costly and time-consuming discov-
ery disputes. The trend also will likely increase the risk that infor-
mation that should be disclosed instead will be the subject of debate,
and at the same time impede settlement. This trend might subvert
the underlying purpose of the Rules themselves: to "secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 73
IV. THE PUBLIC "RIGHT" OF ACCESS
A. The Historically Private Nature of Discovery
Prior to the enactment of the Rules, little, if any, discovery
preceded civil trials. Although both English law and American fed-
eral law afforded parties some ability to obtain documents and
depositions, these mechanisms were extremely narrow in scope. In
the federal courts, the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for the taking
of depositions, but only in cases where a deposition was necessary
to preserve testimony—such as where the deponent was more than
200 miles from the court, about to leave the country, old, or sick. 74
State court procedures were scarcely more expansive, at least until
the appearance of the Field Code in 1848. 75 Thus, discovery issues
historically occupied a far less significant role in civil trials than they
recently have assumed. Ambush and surprise were the marching
orders of the day, much as burial by paper avalanche governs
modern trial practice.
The Judiciary Act made no particular provisions regarding
rights of access to discovery. Although the Act provided for depo-
sitions to be sealed prior to trial, that provision was not intended to
72 See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 27, 4 2040, at 291-92 (discussing
the court's concern that discovery may be used merely as a "device" to obtain information).
See also Marcus, supra note 2, at 7-8, where the author reiterates the general assumption that
any use of discovery materials except to prepare for trial is inappropriate, and states that
one reason this assumption is difficult to prove is that it is so pervasive.
73 FED. R. Qv. P. 1.
74 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2002 (1970).
75 See generally 41 MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.03
(2d ed. 1986); Developments in the Law—Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 946-51 (1961).
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protect confidentiality, but rather to insure that the transcript would
not be altered before trial. 76 The only federal statute directly to
address the question of public access to discovery materials prior to
the adoption of the Rules was the Publicity in Taking Evidence Act
of 1913. 77 This Act specifically provided for public access to depo-
sitions in antitrust actions. The very fact that such a statute was
required to make depositions public in such cases underscores the
traditionally private nature of discovery.78
What little discovery did exist prior to the enactment of the
Rules was, by custom, not open to the public. Even without the
benefit of a procedural device comparable to a Rule 26(c) protective
order, a court sitting in equity could prevent public access to dis-
covery through its equity powers. In fact, in 1912, a Massachusetts
court sitting in equity barred the press and other members of the
public from attending a deposition on the grounds that the depo-
sition was not part of the formal trial and that the testimony con-
tained therein might not be admissible in evidence."
The adoption of the Rules in 1938 did nothing to alter this
traditionally private nature of discovery. Because discovery usually
takes place in law offices or on other private property, as a practical
matter the public generally is unable to determine when or where
discovery proceedings will take place and has no certain right to
attend them even if they are aware of the time and place. 8° Initially,
the Rules required that the parties file with the court all interro-
gatory answers, responses to requests for admissions, and deposition
transcripts. The 1980 amendments to Rule 5(d) permit courts to
order that such materials not be filed. 8 ' As a result of these amend-
ments, designed to ease the paper avalanche that still plagues the
courts, 82 many district courts have adopted local rules eliminating
the filing requirement for some or all of these discovery materials."
76 Louis Werner Stave Co. v. Marden, Orth & Hastings Co., 280 F. 601, 604 (2d Cir.
1922).
77 Act of March 3, 1913, ch. 114, 37 Stat. 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1982)); see
Marcus, supra note 2, at 38-40.
" Marcus, supra note 2, at 40.
79 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 198 F. 870, 874-76 (D, Mass. 1912).
BC See Marcus, supra note 2, at 12-13.
See FED. R. CP/. P. 5(d). For a more detailed discussion of Rule 5(d), see infra text
accompanying notes 192-230.
82 See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 540-41 (1980)
(Report of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules).
" See, e.g., Local Rules, Central District of California, Rule 6(d) (all discovery); Local
Rules, Middle District of Florida, Rule 3.03(c) (interrogatories), 3.03(d) (depositions).
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Thus, nothing in the Rules themselves suggests that discovery is in
any way a public process.
Since the adoption of the Rules, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized a right based on the common law, rather than on any
constitutional provision, to inspect judicial records and documents."
The Court, however, has never indicated that this right would ex-
tend to purely pretrial discovery materials. Interestingly,.one year
after recognizing the common law public right of access to court
records, the Court refused to recognize a sixth amendment right on
the part of the press and the public to attend a criminal pretrial
suppression hearing. 85 Nonetheless, the Court ultimately did rec-
ognize a public right of access to attend, a criminal courtroom trial
based on the first amendment." The recognition of a first amend-
ment right in this context has subsequently been extended to en-
compass a public right of access to attend both preliminary
hearings87 and voir dire examinations of jurors" in criminal pro-
ceedings.
The Supreme Court has never recognized a first amendment
right to attend civil trials, although at least three circuit courts of
appeals have done so to date." In addition, some commentators
have suggested that this may be the next logical step in extending
the public right of access." More importantly, however, the Su-
preme Court has never held that pretrial documents produced in
either civil or criminal cases are subject to either a constitutional,
common law, or statutory public right of access. In fact, the only
" Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
as Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 445 U.S. 368 (1979).
55 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion); see
also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (striking down a mandatory
closure rule applicable to trials for sexual offenses involving victims under age 18). The Globe
Court stated, however, that the presumption of access was not absolute. Id. at 606.
" See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
" See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
59 Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (I Ith Cir. 1985); Publicker Indus.,
Inc. v. Cohen, Inc., 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983); see also Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (dicta); cf. In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724
F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1984) (recognizing right of access to contempt proceedings, charac-
terized as a "hybrid containing both civil and criminal characteristics"). But see In re Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (no public right of access
to civil trials).
90 See, e.g., Note, Publicker Industries v. Cohen: Public Access to Civil Proceedings and A
Corporation's Right to Privacy, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1319, 1336-40 (1987); Comment, The First
Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials After Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 286, 294-98 (1984).
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Supreme Court case even to address the impact of the first amend-
ment on civil discovery prior to Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, far from
requiring access, held that a court could not constitutionally require
the disclosure of NAACP membership lists. The Court reasoned
that such disclosure would have a negative impact on the members'
first amendment freedom of association. 9 '
The source of a constitutional public right of access, if indeed
one exists, must be found in the first amendment's protection of
communication about the functioning of government, which em-
powers everyone to be a "judicial watchdog."" The "right" must be
seen as an adjunct to the right to engage in speech and commentary
about the efficiency and fairness of the court system. While not
articulated in the words of the first amendment," courts that have
discerned the "right" have found it by implication, on the theory
that it is necessary in order to enjoy the other, articulated first
amendment rights.'" Even if public access exists as a means of
heightening respect for the judicial process and permitting scrutiny
of judicial performance, the concept simply has no application in
the pretrial discovery process. As another commentator has stated:
[T]he evolving constitutional and common law doctrines
of right of access to certain judicial proceedings simply do
not and should not apply to pretrial discovery in civil cases
. . . There is no reason for perpetuating the myth that
pretrial discovery is public. To the extent that any decision
concerning the availability of a protective order depends
upon that myth, it is flawed. 95
Indeed, the history against which any claims of public access to
discovery materials must be assessed is, as discussed above, one of
confidentiality.
B. Conflict in the Circuits Before Seattle Times
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Seattle Times, lower
courts were divided on the question of whether a public right of
9L NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 456 (1958).
91 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1982).
93 The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or of the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
94 Cf. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604.
Marcus, supra note 2, at 40-41.
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access to pretrial discovery documents in civil cases existed at all,
and if it did exist, whether it was rooted in the Constitution or • in
the common law. In International Products Corp. v. Koons, 96 which for
a time stood as one of the few authorities in this area, Judge
Friendly, writing for a unanimous Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
flatly rejected the recognition of any first amendment right. In
Koons, the district court sealed the deposition testimony of the plain-
tiff corporation. The court of appeals upheld the district court's
power to limit the defendants' use of the deposition testimony.
Judge Friendly concluded that the court could "entertain no doubt
about the constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal court to
forbid the publicizing, in advance of trial, of information obtained
by one party from another by use of the court's processes." 97
In In re Halkin,98
 a divided District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals, taking a divergent approach, suggested that a protective
order could be analogized to a "prior restraint" and thus subject to
strict scrutiny under the first amendment. 99 The plaintiffs in Halkin
alleged that the CIA and National Security Agency conducted un-
lawful surveillance of them because they opposed the Vietnam war.
The plaintiffs gave written notice that they intended to release to
the press documents obtained during discovery that related to Op-
eration CHAOS, the code name for the CIA's surveillance of anti-
war activists. Prior to production, those documents had been purged
of all information that related to national security. Although they
96
 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963). Koons involved a motion by the president of a corporation
to limit his deposition testimony under the predecessor to Rule 26(c), Rule 30(b), authorizing
the sealing of depositions. The deposition at issue contained facts indicating that officers of
the corporation had made improper payments to officials of a foreign government. The
government intervened and moved for an order limiting dissemination of this information
on the basis that its disclosure could be inimical to private American business interests and
to United States foreign policy.
97
 Id. at 407.
" 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Halkin involved an action by opponents of the Vietnam
War who contended that the government had engaged in a program of unlawful surveillance
against them. The plaintiffs obtained numerous documents in discovery that purportedly
substantiated their claims, and declared their intention to release the documents to the media.
The defendants moved for and the court issued a protective order under Rule 26(c). Id. at
179-81. The District of Columbia Circuit Court reversed on a petition for a writ of mandamus.
Id. at 182. For a more detailed discussion of Halkin, see Note, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders and
the First Amendment, 80 Count. L. REV. 1645 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Rule 26(c) Protective
Orders] (proposing an extension of the Halkin test); see also Comment, Protective Orders Pro-
hibiting Dissemination of Discovery Information: The First Amendment and Good Cause, 1980 DUKE
L.J. 766 (analyzing Halkin and proposing a balancing test).
99 Halkin, 598 F.2d at 183, 186.
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had not done so at the time of production, the defendants re-
sponded to the notice of the plaintiffs' intended press release with
a motion for a protective order.
The Halkin court set out a three-part test for measuring the
first amendment propriety of a protective order that limits the
dissemination of discovery materials: whether the harm posed by
dissemination was substantial and serious; whether the restraining
order was narrowly drawn and precise; and whether there was an
alternative means of protecting the public interest that intruded less
directly on expression.'" Applying this test, the Halkin court con-
cluded that the order before it violated the first amendment because
the defendants had offered no evidence to support their contention
that dissemination was likely to result in "substantial and serious
harm" to their right to a fair trial. In addition, the defendants made
no attempt to show that they could not have averted the anticipated
harm by some less intrusive means.m
Judge Wilkey, in a compelling dissent that presaged the Su-
preme Court's subsequent decision in Seattle Times, emphasized the
anomaly of the majority's position. The majority acknowledged a
court's authority under Rule 26(c) to permit the more intrusive
remedy of denying discovery altogether based solely on a showing
of "good cause," but limited the court's power to order the less
intrusive remedy of prescribing how the discovery information
could be used. 102 In opining that the "good cause" standard enun-
ciated in Rule 26(c) was, in itself, adequate to protect the first
amendment rights of litigants, Judge Wilkey emphasized that liti-
gants wishing to disseminate discovery materials have gained access
to such materials only through a system of federal rules that ex-
pressly reserves to the courts the power to attach restrictions on
their use. "Thus, when litigants receive discovery materials, they
receive them already subject to the court's exercise of this discretion-
ary power."'"
100 1d. at 191.
101 /d. at 197. The Halkin approach, requiring strict scrutiny of protective orders under
the first amendment, was adopted by several other courts prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Seattle Times. See, e.g., In re Upjohn Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Litig., 664 F.2d
114 (6th Cir. 1981); National Polymer Products v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418 (6th
Cir. 1981).
102 Halkin, 598 F.2d at 208-09 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
10$ Id. at 206 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See also Comment, The First
Amendment Right to Disseminate Discovery Materials: In re Halkin, 92 HARV. L. Rev. 1550 (1979).
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In the third leading pre-Seattle Times case, In re San Juan Star
co.,104 the First Circuit Court of Appeals declined to adopt the
approach of either Koons or Halkin and instead announced a new,
four-part test, characterized as "good cause" with "heightened sen-
sitivity to the first amendment concerns at stake," 1 °5 to determine
the constitutionality of protective orders limiting dissemination. In
San Juan Star, the San Juan Star newspaper sought to intervene in
a federal civil rights action brought by the relatives of two members
of a radical Puerto Rican political group who had been slain by
police officers. The newspaper challenged a district court order that
prohibited the disclosure of deposition evidence to the public or
the press. The First Circuit Court of Appeals fashioned a new test
to determine whether the protective order violated the first amend-
ment.
Under the San Juan Star test, the factors to be considered
included: the magnitude and imminence of the threatened harm;
the effectiveness of the protective order in preventing the harm;
the availability of less restrictive means of preventing the harm; and
the narrowness of the order. 1 °6 Employing this test, the San Juan
Star court sustained the protective order at issue insofar as it related
to restraints on disclosure to the press or to any third party. 1 " The
court explained:
Unlike evidence at trial, [discovery information] has not
passed the strict threshold tests of relevance and admis-
sibility, yet it has been compelled by dint of legal process.
The information revealed may be irrelevant, prejudicial,
or pose an undue invasion of an individual's privacy.
Such undigested matter, forced from the mouth of
an unwilling deponent, is hardly material encompassed
within a broad public "right to know." Its disclosure would
1 O4 662 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1981). San Juan Star originated as a civil rights action against
several agents of the Puerto Rican government. The case was brought by relatives of two
suspected terrorists killed by the police on the eve of a closely contested electoral campaign.
The district court had issued a protective order prohibiting the attorneys from disclosing
discovery information to the litigants, the press, or any third party. For a more detailed
discussion of San Juan Star, see Comment, In re San Juan Star: Discovery and the First Amend-
ment, 34 BAYLOR L. Ray. 229 (1982).
"San Juan Star, 662 F.2d at 116.
106 Id, Compare Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 912
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (antitrust action where court forniulated a similar balancing test).
147 San Juan Star, 662 F.2d at 116-17. The court struck down that part of the order
purporting to restrict dissemination to the litigants themselves on the basis that it would
impermissibly interfere with the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 118.
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not advanCe the informed civic and political discussion
that the first amendment is intended to protect.'"
It presumably was in order to resolve the conflict among the circuits
on the question of the appropriate standard of review for protective
orders that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Seattle Times v.
Rhinehart.'0
C. Seattle Times v. Rhinehart
Seattle Times v. Rhinehart began as a state court action against
the Seattle Times newspaper for defamation and invasion of privacy.
The Seattle Times had published a series of unfavorable articles
concerning the plaintiff, Rhinehart, and an obscure religious foun-
dation of which Rhinehart was the spiritual leader.' 10
During discovery, the Seattle Times had requested the produc-
tion of documents, including documents relating to the financial
affairs of Rhinehart and his organization. Rhinehart produced some
documents, but declined to disclose his current residence and the
names of the foundation's members and donors. When the Seattle
Times moved for an order to compel, Rhinehart sought a protective
order to limit further dissemination of the information by the news-
paper.
The trial court granted the protective order, which prohibited
the Seattle Times from publishing any information about the church's
membership and donors except to the extent necessary to prepare
for and try the case. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's exercise of its discretion in granting the order. The
court held that the order, which was intended to preserve the plain-
tiff's privacy rights, satisfied the "good cause" standard of Wash-
108 Id. at 115.
in 467 U.S. 20 (1984). The Supreme Court characterized the decision of the Washington
Supreme Court in Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226, 654 P.2d 678 (1982), as
consistent with the then-unambiguous position of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
enunciated in International Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963). But see In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987)
(post-Seattle Times Second Circuit case recognizing a public right of access). The Supreme
Court's decision also appeared to be consistent with Judge Wilkey's dissent in In re Halkin,
598 F.2d 176, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). See Note, "Good Cause," supra note
13, at 555 n.55 (1986); Note, Clear Standards for Discovery Protective Orders: A Missed Opportunity
in Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 123 (1984).
11° The articles described, among other things, seances conducted by Rhinehart, his sale
of magical "stones" that had been expelled from his body, and a six-hour extravaganza at
the Walla Walla State Penitentiary involving cash prizes and a chorus line of bikini-clad
women. Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 22-23 (1984).
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ington's analogue to Rule 26(c),"' and accordingly, did not violate
the first amendment.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed unanimously, hold-
ing squarely that a protective order does not offend the first amend-
ment where it is entered on a showing of good cause as required
by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial discovery, and
does not restrict dissemination of information gained from other
sources." 2 In so holding, the Court specifically stated that "restraints
placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a
restriction on a traditionally public source of information."" 3 The
Court also emphasized that a litigant's power to compel another
party to a lawsuit to produce discovery is a product of legislative
grace, not the Constitution, and can be limited or even denied
altogether without impinging on the first amendment." 4
The Court observed that the right to gather information
through discovery is found not in the Constitution, but only in
legislation like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or analogous
state counterparts. Thus, the Court rejected both the asserted first
amendment right of the party opponent to disseminate freely oth-
erwise private information gathered in discovery and any supposed
first amendment right of the press or the public to obtain access to
such information. The Court in Seattle Times framed the issue before
it as "whether a litigant's freedom comprehends the right to dissem-
inate information that he has obtained pursuant to a court order
that both granted him access to that information and placed re-
straints on the way in which the information might be used."" 5
Because the Seattle Times was a media defendant, however, the de-
cision necessarily also resolved, or should have resolved, the conflict
over any purported right of access by the public or the press. If the
parties have no right to disseminate the materials to the public, then
it follows that the public can have no separate right of access." 6
" 1 The protective order was issued pursuant to Washington state discovery provisions
modeled after the Federal Rules, Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 with WASH. SUPER. C•r.
R. 26-37. Rhinehart had presented to the court affidavits detailing anonymous threats of
harassment and physical harm to individuals affiliated with the foundation if the information
was released.
112 467 U.S. at 34.
113 /d. at 33.
1 " Id. at 32.
"5 1d.
12S See Pownell, The First Amendment and Pretrial Discovery Hearings: When Should the Public
and Press Have Access ► , 36 UCLA L. REV. 609 (1989) (Seattle Times addressed both dissemi-
nation and public access issues).
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D. The Aftermath of Seattle Times
1. The Constitutional Right of Access
Despite the seeming clarity of the Seattle Times opinion, courts
have continued to struggle with the question of whether a first
amendment public right of access to pretrial discovery materials
exists." 7 The courts' concern over this issue probably reflects a
strong belief that anything remotely connected with the administra-
tion of the judicial system should be open to public scrutiny. The
concern seems to be particularly acute in cases involving the safety
of mass-marketed consumer products and significant newsworthy
events.
A handful of courts have plainly taken the position that the.
Supreme Court "meant what it said" in its explicit Seattle Times
holding, and that protective orders do not implicate first amend-
ment concerns in any way." 8 Perhaps the leading case adopting this
"strict" interpretation is Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.," 9 a well-
publicized "failure to warn" action brought against several large
cigarette companies. in order to streamline the litigation, the mag-
istrate supervising discovery in that case had issued an umbrella
protective order covering documentation of the industry's knowl-
edge of the health risks associated with smoking. 12° The district
court subsequently modified the order, characterizing Seattle Times
as "imprecise" as to whether such orders were subject to strict
constitutional scrutiny and the application of first amendment stan-
dards.'" The Third Circuit Court of Appeals granted a writ of
mandamus and ordered the district court to reconsider its ruling.
The appeals court explained that there is simply "no room for lower
"7 Seattle Times has been characterized as a triumph of judicial administrative control
over the discovery process. Note, Access to Pretrial Documents Under the First Amendment, 84
CoLum. L. REV. 1813, 1837 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Access to Pretrial Documents].
See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1119-20 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987); New York v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 771 F.2d 796,
802-03 (3d Cir. 1985); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 737 F.2d 1170, 1172 (D.C. Cir.
1984); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 597 F. Supp, 621, 623 (D.D.C. 1984); see also Public
Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 780 (let Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 838
(1989) (recognizing that any first amendment right of access claim independent of Rule 26(c)
is "largely foreclosed" by Seattle Times); DeFord v. Schmid Prods. Co., 120 F.R.D. 648, 654
n.5 (D. Md. 1987) (a general first amendment public right of access is "precluded" by Seattle
Times); in re Consumers' Power Co. Sec. Litig., 109 F.R.D. 45 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
"g 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986).
12° For the text of the magistrate's protective order, see Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1112 n.4.
121 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 573, 582 (D.N.J. 1985).
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courts to consider first amendment factors in fashioning or review-
ing Rule 26(c) orders .. . .[T]he first amendment is simply irrelevant
to protective orders in civil discovery. "122
Other courts, however, have shown a hesitancy to interpret the
Supreme Court's words literally. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc.' 23
 perhaps
best exemplifies this hesitancy. In Anderson, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals read Seattle Times as foreclosing "any claim of an absolute
public right to access to discovery materials," 124 but nonetheless
characterized the extent of the public's right of access to judicial
proceedings as "still in the process of being defined." 25 Anderson
was a highly-publicized toxic waste case in which the court was
confronted with a number of issues, among them the constitution-
ality of a protective order that selectively granted media access to
pretrial discovery information.' 26 One of the media intervenors in
the case specifically requested access to documents considered by
the court with respect to certain discovery proceedings. The Ander-
son court read Seattle Times as holding only that protective orders
implicate the first amendment "to a far lesser extent" than restraints
in other contexts.' 27 It thus concluded that, while such orders are
not subject to strict or heightened scrutiny, the first amendment
must still retain a "presence" in the review process within the "good
cause" framework of Rule 26(c). 128
In Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1119. On remand, the district court determined that the mag-
istrate had not sufficiently articulated good cause for the order and issued a new, more
limited protective order. Cipollone, 113 F.R.D. at 89. The defendants again sought a writ of
mandamus vacating the district court's modification of the magistrate's order, but the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit this time denied the writ, stating that the district courts
consideration of the "public interest" in the good cause analysis was permissible inasmuch as
the "public interest" had not itself been evaluated under a first amendment standard. Ci-
pollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 822 F.2d 335, 341 (3d Cir. 1987).
123 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
124 Id. at 6.
In Id. at 10.
126 The plaintiffs in Anderson alleged that the defendant had contaminated their town's
drinking water supply by discharging toxic chemicals into the ground, causing serious illnesses
and death. After more than three years of discovery, the interest of the news media was
aroused, and the district court issued a protective order prohibiting the parties from revealing
information obtained through discovery except to governmental authorities. An amended
order contained an exception allowing the parties' experts to reveal the information to the
academic community, but forbade all press releases for general distribution. Later, the court
also excepted one television station from the scope of the order. Thereafter, another news
organization, the Boston Globe, was allowed to intervene, but it was denied access to the
protected discovery information.
In
 Id. at 7 (citing Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984)).
In Id. ; see also United States v. Kentucky Mils. Co., 124 F.R.D. 146, 152 n.5 (E.D. Ky.
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Although the Anderson court explicitly structured its analysis
within the "good cause" framework of Rule 26(c), it actually applied
a standard of review more closely resembling the heightened scru-
tiny that the First Circuit Court of Appeals had followed prior to
Seattle Times.' 29 The Anderson court specifically inquired into the
magnitude of the harm posed by the dissemination, the ability of
the order to protect against that harm, the scope of the order, and
the existence of less restrictive means.'" The court ultimately con-
cluded that, based on the fundamental difference between discovery
proceedings and other judicial proceedings, there exists no public
right of access to pretrial discovery materials, including documents
submitted to the court in connection with a discovery motion."'
Thus, the decision again leaves unclear what once appeared to have
been resolved by Seattle Times: the precise relationship between Rule
26(c)'s good cause requirement and the first amendment. As an-
other commentator has observed, the unfortunate result of this
defect in clarity "may be to broaden the 'good, cause' requirement
unduly, defeat the reliability and flexibility of a Rule 26(c) order
and relegate the applicable standard back to the conflict character-
istic of pre-Seattle Times decisions."'"
Similar confusion is evident in the well-publicized In re "Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litigation,'" a multi-district class action. In
Agent Orange, the magistrate's opinion set aside an umbrella protec-
tive order, including an agreement to return to the defendants all
discovery materials after the parties had reached a settlement. The
magistrate in Agent Orange initially acknowledged that, in light of
Seattle Times, there could be "no question" that the first amendment
1989) (antitrust case adopting Anderson court's position that first amendment concerns are
not totally irrelevant after Seattle Times).
' 2Y See In re San Juan Star, 662 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1981).
110 Anderson, 805 F.2d at 7-9.
13 ' Id. at 13; see also In re Alexander Grant & Co. Ling., 820 F.2d 352, 355 (1Ith Cir.
1987) (drawing distinction between private documents collected during discovery and judicial
records); In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1338 (D.C. Cir.
1985). The Anderson court held, however, that access to pretrial discovery could not be
afforded selectively to some members of the general public but not to others.
In Note, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders, First Amendment Scrutiny and the Good Cause Standard,
21 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 909, 915 (1987) (arguing that the First Circuit Court of Appeals should
have more carefully distinguished the litigants' desire to disseminate information at issue in
Seattle Times from the requests of media sources—non-parties to the litigation—for access to
the discovery materials involved in Anderson).
'" 104 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
344 (1987).
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does not require open access to discovery materials.'" Inexplicably,
however, later in the same opinion, the magistrate stated:
The Court in Seattle Times approved a limitation on First
Amendment rights upon a showing of good cause. In the
absence of such a showing, continued protection would
violate the First Amendment, particularly in this case,
which is of great interest to the public and the media.'"
The magistrate's opinion in Agent Orange was adopted by the district
court, and approved by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.'" It
is noteworthy, however, that the appeals court, in affirming, avoided
any discussion of a purported constitutional right of access, basing
its decision instead on a "statutory" right of access arising in part,
it concluded, by implication from Rule 26(c)'s "good cause" require-
ment and from the filing requirement under Rule 5(d).' 37 Yet,
inasmuch as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not explicitly
reject the magistrate's confused first amendment analysis, its deci-
sion seems only to have further contributed to the uncertainty
surrounding a constitutional right of public access which, one would
have thought, Seattle Times had plainly put to rest.
Even some courts that previously found no first amendment
right of access to discovery materials have recently suggested that
such a right may attach at some later stage of the litigation, when
the public interest in open court proceedings supposedly outweighs
the need for an efficient judicial process.'" In addition, several
courts have suggested that there may exist a first amendment public
right of access to documents considered by a court in ruling on
pretrial motions that are dispositive of the litigants' substantive
rights.' 39
 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, has
characterized this position as being "at the farthest reaches of the
154
 Id. at 566.
135 Id. at 570.
158 1n re "Agent Orange" Prod. Lab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987).
1 "See infra text accompanying notes 192-230 for a discussion of the right to access
under Rule 5(d).
158 See, e.g., In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 109 F.R.D. 45,55 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(emphasizing in denying press access to pretrial discovery materials that a much stricter test
would apply for exclusion of the public at later stages of the litigation).
159 See, e.g., in re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302,1308-10 (7th Cir. 1984); Joy
v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC,
710 F.2d 1 165 (6th Cir. 1983) (recognizing first amendment public right of access to record
of administrative proceedings, including discovery documents, under review by court).
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first amendment right to attend judicial proceedings." 14° The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has flatly rejected it as
being inconsistent with Seattle Times's reference to the admission of
evidence as the "touchstone" of any first amendment right of ac-
cess."'
The equivocal opinions of some courts in the wake of Seattle
Times, suggesting that there may yet exist a first amendment public
right of access to pretrial discovery materials, cannot be squared
with either the explicit holding of Seattle Times or with the realities
of modern-day discovery practice. Civil litigation is, by definition, a
process of dispute resolution between private parties and, in fact, the
overwhelming number of disputes are resolved without the inter-
vention of the courts. The mere existence of court rules and pro-
cesses for assisting the parties in resolving their differences cannot
reasonably be construed to give rise to any constitutional right on
the part of strangers to the dispute or to any undefinable "public
right to know." The parties to a private lawsuit should be allowed
to maintain their right to privacy, as well as their right to a fair trial
in the event that settlement is not achieved, irrespective of the
curiosity or business concerns of non-parties.
Commentators have argued that some information may be "so
significant to the preservation of the process of self governance .. .
that it would violate the [first] amendment to keep the press and
public from that knowledge." 142 This suggestion, taken to its logical
extreme, would make every piece of discovery open to judicial
scrutiny, if for no other reason than the need to determine whether
the information achieves the level of significance required to impli-
cate self-government. The parties' legitimate interest in the privacy
of their documents and information would then be subject to the
whim of individual judges in deciding what is important for our
"self-governance," a task, it is submitted, that judges are ill-suited
to perform. While it is true that in some situations the "public
interest" in obtaining access to information may appear strong, as,
for example, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Gridley, where the
petitioning newspapers sought discovery materials that were rele-
140 Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d I, 8 (1st Cir. 1986); cf. Federal Trade Comm'n
v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987).
141 In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1338 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
142 Note, Access to Pretrial Documents, supra note 117, at 1833; see also Note, Rule 26(c)
Protective Orders, supra note 98, at 1656 (arguing that there is a substantial public interest in
the actions of large enterprises similar to the interest in the actions of government).
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vant to the physical condition and fitness for office of a United
States Senator who was seeking re-election,R 3 the function of the
judicial system is to resolve private disputes—not to generate infor-
mation for public consumption.'"
2. The Common Law Right of Access
Just as a broad purported public right of access to pretrial
discovery materials finds no support in the Constitution, it also finds
no foundation in the common law.' 45 Although a public right of
access to actual court documents based on the common law may
well exist, this right does not apply to pretrial discovery proceedings.
As previously indicated, the Supreme Court, along with a number
of lower courts, has recognized a common law right to inspect and
copy judicial records and documents based on a "citizen's desire to
keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies."'" The
right of access to judicial records is considered "fundamental to a
democratic state," 147 and is based on the principle that "what tran-
spires in the court room is public property. "148 Inspection, it has
" 8
 510 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1987).
14 See Marcus, supra note 2, at 52.
145
 The common law right is said to pre-date the Constitution, while the first amendment
right is of more recent vintage. The latter, however, is generally thought to be based on
tradition. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 29 n.118. This ambiguity has sometimes caused the
two terms to be used interchangeably. See id. The major difference between viewing the
public right of access as a common law—rather than a constitutional—guarantee, is that a
common law right apparently can be more easily overcome by reasons favoring secrecy. See
In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc.,
805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse
Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986). But see Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d
1568, 1570-71 (11th Cir. 1985) (incorporating constitutional standard into common law
analysis).
In addition, the appellate standard of review under the common law is an abuse-of-
discretion test, while the constitutional standard is generally more stringent. Anderson, 805
F.2d at 13; Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 390; see also In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co.,
723 F.2d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Application of NBC, Inc., 653 F.2d 609, 613 (D.C.
Cir. 1981). Beyond this, the distinction between the constitutional and common law rights is
somewhat ambiguous.
18 Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978); see also Newman v.
Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th Cir. 1983); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp.
866 (F.D. Pa. 1981). See generally Note, The Common Law Right to Inspeit and Copy Judicial
Records: In Camera or On Camera, 16 GA. L. REV. 659, 666-72 (1982).
1 " United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
"8 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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been said, "serves to produce 'an informed and enlightened public
opinion. ",149
In refining the precise contours of this presumptive common
law right, some courts have recognized a presumptive right of access
to the transcripts of hearings on pretrial motions,'" to the record
of administrative proceedings under review) 5 ' to documents sub-
mitted in support of certain motions (such as motions for summary
judgment) filed with the court, 152 and to settlement agreements
submitted to the court for approval.'" Where information pro-
duced in discovery has actually been admitted into evidence at an
open trial, a presumptive common law right of public access may
attach.'" Even then, however, the right is not absolute. The Su-
preme Court has stated that "every court has supervisory power
over its own records and files, and access has been denied where
court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes."'"
More importantly, there is general agreement, that while a
common law public right of access may attach to materials forming
145 Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1258 (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936)).
155
 Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066-71 (3d Cir. 1984).
151 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179-
80 (6th Cir. 1983).
155 In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308-09 (7th Cir. 1984); Joy v. North,
692 F.2d 880, 893-94 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); see also In re Coor-
dinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34, 41-43 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (affirming existence of common law right of access to pretrial briefs and statements,
summary judgment motions, and supporting affidavits and exhibits).
1 " Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339 (3d
Cir. 1986). In Hotel Rittenhouse, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a trial
court may permit settlement and enforcement proceedings to be or remain sealed only where
the party seeking to retain confidentiality can make a specific showing that the need to
preserve confidentiality outweighs the general presumption in favor of public access to
judicial filings. Id. at 344. The court acknowledged that the terms of the settlement would
remain confidential had the parties merely filed a stipulation of dismissal and refrained from
filing the actual settlement agreement with the court or seeking enforcement of the agree-
ment. By holding that a settling party can have either confidentiality or court enforcement
of a settlement, but not both, however, the court may have created a disincentive for settle-
ment. Cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1986) (media
have no common law right of access to settlement records on file with the court).
154 See, e.g., In re CBS, Inc., 828 F.2d 958, 959 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming common law
right of access to evidence presented in open court session); see also Wilson v. American
Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming common law right of access
to civil trial records).
"' Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978); see also Times Herald
Printing Co. v. Jones, M.D., 717 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing that
common law right of access to records is not absolute and "must bow to the discretion of the
trial judge in making a decision based upon the facts of a particular case").
804	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:771
the basis for a decision on the merits, it does not extend to purely
pretrial discovery materials. 156 Indeed, no court of record appears
ever to have extended the common law public right of access to
materials that have not been introduced as evidence at trial or at
least as documentation in support of trial papers or motions to the
court. 157 And, to the extent that the law in this area may once
arguably have been uncertain, the Supreme Court substantially pre-
cluded the common law claim in its Seattle Times decision.' 58 The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has recently refused to rec-
ognize a presumptive common law public right of access to docu-
ments submitted to a trial court for its ruling on a pretrial discovery
motion, noting that discovery is "fundamentally different" from
those other proceedings for which a public right of access has been
realized.'" The court stated: "There is no tradition of public access
to discovery, and requiring a trial court to scrutinize carefully public
claims of access would be incongruous with the goals of the discov-
ery process. "160
156 See, e.g., In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 355 (11th Cir. 1987);
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir.
1987); Anderson v, Cryovac, 805 F.2d I, 13 (1st Cir. 1986); Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 119
F.R.D. 683, 684 (D. Minn. 1987); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 96 F.R.D. 582,
584 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); see also In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d
1325, 1340, 1342 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (both majority and dissenting opinions agreeing that
the common law presumption does not go beyond evidentiary materials used in determining
the litigants' substantive rights); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); ef. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988)
(no public right of access to summary jury trial). See generally Pownell, supra note 116
(distinguishing between access to pretrial adjudicatory proceedings and access to discovery
materials).
1 " Even in the context of a motion for summary judgment, there may be good reasons
for denying access to the underlying materials—at least where the motion is denied—because
such a decision is not dispositive but rather is most properly characterized as a refusal to
decide the merits of the case. Given the frequency and ease with which parties move for
summary judgment, sometimes as a pretext for public dissemination of discovery materials,
the recognition of a common law right of access in this context is troublesome. See Marcus,
supra note 2, at 49. A rule that a party must disclose to the public all materials submitted in
conjunction with a motion for summary judgment that is ultimately denied could preclude
later settlements premised on confidentiality.
155 Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 788 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 838 (1989). In Seattle limes Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984), the Supreme
Court entered a protective order prohibiting the Times from using discovery information "in
any way except as necessary to prepare and try its case." Further, the Court "rejected the
suggestion that review of a protective order requires any heightened scrutiny under the first
amendment." 858 F.2d at 788, See also Anderson, 805 F.2d at 13.
159 Anderson, 805 F.2d at 13.
'90 1d.
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Nevertheless, other courts have invoked the common law pre-
sumption of public access in recent cases involving documents sub-
ject to protective orders in ways that bode poorly for defendants
who seek to rely on such orders to safeguard proprietary infor-
mation. For example, in Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 161 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized a common law public right of access
to documents that were discovered under the aegis of a protective
order but that were erroneously admitted into evidence at trial. The
underlying case was a products liability action in which the plaintiff
claimed that she had been injured by a defectively designed BIC
disposable lighter. The trial was bifurcated into liability and dam-
ages phases, and following a verdict for the plaintiff in the liability
phase, the case was settled. Following settlement, BIC moved to
have the record sealed; the court denied this motion and dismissed
the case. Thereafter, in accordance with the terms of a stipulated
protective order, all exhibits designated "confidential" were re-
turned to the lawyers for BIC.' 62
Subsequently, the Philadelphia Inquirer (PNI), researching a
story on the BIC lighter litigation, attempted to intervene to secure
access to the trial exhibits, including confidential documents covered
by the protective order whose admission into evidence had not been
contested. PNI based its application for intervention on an asserted
common law public right of access. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals declined to review the intervention order because BIG had
never challenged the propriety of the intervention in the court
below.'" The correctness of that order, however, because it was
based solely on the common law right of access claimed by BIC, is
itself questionable. It is highly doubtful whether, under the Rules,
a third party seeking access to a record after termination of an
action should be allowed to proceed without filing a separate com-
plaint or an order to show cause.' 64
181 851 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1988).
162 id, at 684-85.
163 Id. at 677 n.7.
I" See Black v. Central Motors Line, Inc., 500 F.2d 407, 408 (4th Cir. 1974) ("Intervention
is ancillary and subordinate to a main cause and whenever an action is terminated, for
whatever reason, there no longer remains an action in which there can be an intervention.");
see also Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323, 328 (3d Cir. 1965). But see Bank. of Am. Nat'l Trust &
Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 341-42 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986) (presuming
intervention to be proper method for seeking access to record even though underlying case
had been settled); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 788 (1st Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 838 (1989) (intervention allowed pursuant to Local Rule 16(g)). See
infra text accompanying notes 184-90 for a discussion of Public Citizen.
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Questions about the propriety of the intervention aside, the
Littlejohn court also agreed with PNI that PNI had a common law
right of access to the confidential exhibits. This was true even
though the exhibits had been admitted into evidence improperly
and the case had been settled. The court observed that "the public's
exercise of its common law access right in civil cases promotes public
confidence in the judicial system by enhancing the testimonial trust-
worthiness and the quality of justice dispensed by the court." 165 The
Littlejohn court reasoned that the defendant's failure to object to the
admission into evidence of the documents at trial constituted a
waiver of any of its potential confidentiality interests under the
protective order. 166
Ultimately, PNI was denied access to certain of the requested
documents based on the court's further finding that any public
access right to those documents evaporated when the court, pur-
suant to administrative practice, returned them to the attorneys
following the settlement. Littlejohn, therefore, may stand only for
the proposition that a common law right of access may attach to
those documents which, though covered by a protective order, are
admitted into evidence, even if erroneously, and that remain part
of the judicial record. Examples of this would be deposition testi-
mony read into evidence at trial or exhibits transcribed and made
a part of the official court transcript. Nevertheless, because of the
Littlejohn court's apparent willingness to allow the original interven-
tion order, based as it was solely on PNI's common law access claim
asserted well after trial and settlement, the decision raises serious
concerns about whether defendants in products liability cases may
continue to rely on the confidentiality of information covered by a
protective order.
3. The Statutory Right of Access
Recently, some courts, unable to discern a public right of access
to discovery materials based either sqUarely on the Constitution or
on the common law, have purported to discern a statutory right of
165 Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678; see also Hotel Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d at 345; United States v.
Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981).
' 66 851 F.2d • at 680. The court explained that the release of the information in open
court constituted a "publication," thus restricting the defendant's ability later unilaterally to
restrict its future use. Id.; see also National Polymer Prods., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641
F.2d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1981).
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access, based on Rules 26(c) and 5(d).' 67
 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit spearheaded this alarming trend in Agent Or-
ange.' 68
 As discussed below, however, neither of these Rules can
reasonably be construed as providing the basis for recognizing a
general public right of access. The court's reliance on a statutory
right to justify the modification of previously entered protective
orders, at the behest of the press or of other third parties, can only
be characterized as patently capricious and a form of judicial tyr-
anny.
a. The Statutory "Right" Under Rule 26(c)
Agent Orange is the leading case supporting the existence of a
public right of access to discovery materials generated in the course
of a private products liability lawsuit based purportedly, at least in
part, on the language of Rule 26(c) itself.' 69 In Agent Orange, some
15,000 Vietnam veterans sought to recover for physical injuries they
allegedly suffered as a result of their exposure to various herbicides
manufactured by a number of chemical companies and supplied to
the government for use in defoliating the Southeast Asian jun-
gles.'"
After the case was settled 171
 and during a Rule 23(e) fairness
hearing, a public interest group, the Vietnam Veterans of America,
along with several non-representative class members and one of the
plaintiff's attorneys, sought access to massive amounts of discovery
produced by the Dow Chemical Company and certain other of the
corporate defendants.' 72 The district court had previously entered
an umbrella protective order during the early stages of the litiga-
tion.'" The Agent Orange special master found the order necessary
1 " See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 953 (1987); see also Public Citizen v. Liggett Croup, Inc., 858 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 838 (1989).
'" 821 F.2d 139.
'" A second basis for the Agent Orange court's recognition of a public right of access was
Rule 5(d). See infra text accompanying notes 192-230 for a complete discussion of Rule 5(d).
170
 The extensive procedural history and general background of the Agent Orange liti-
gation is summarized in In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d l45 (2d Cir. 1987).
See also Discovery Documents Are Public, News MEDIA & THE LAW, Summer 1987, at 13-14.
See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E,D.N.Y. 1984) (settle-
ment opinion).
L72 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,' 104 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). For the text
of Rule 23(e), see FED. R. Dv. P. 23(e).
172 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 96 F.R.D. 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The full
text of the protective order is reprinted in the Appendix to the opinion. Id. at 585-87.
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due to the "complexity of [the] litigation, the emotionalism sur-
rounding the issues, the number of documents yet to be reviewed
and the desirability of moving discovery expeditiously in order to
meet the [trial date]." 174
After concluding that neither the Constitution nor the common
law provided the applicants with a sufficient basis for obtaining
access to the discovery materials,' 75 the magistrate, in an opinion
later adopted by the district court,'" relied in part on the Rule 26(c)
requirement that a party seeking a protective order prove that
"good cause" exists to limit access to discovery material.'" The
magistrate's reasoning was apparently that the procedural burden
on the party seeking confidentiality indicated a congressional intent
that materials and information generated by discovery under normal
circumstances be open for public review and dissemination:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) presumes that discovery materials are
open to the public. The Rule's requirement that the pro-
ponent of non-disclosure prove that good cause exists to
limit public access to discovery material demonstrates that,
in the absence of such proof, the discovery is open to the
public.' 78
The magistrate essentially "explained away" Seattle Times, stat-
ing only that the Supreme Court had "tacitly affirmed the validity
of the statutory presumption" when it approved the trial court's
exercise of its discretion in finding that good cause in that case had
been shown.' 7° Nowhere in Seattle Times, however, did the Court
make any mention of any statutory presumption of public access.
The Court was concerned only with the legitimacy of controls over
extrajudicial use of the discovery information by the defendant,
who in that case happened to be a media entity. Moreover, the
Court addressed that issue only after it had already held that that
174 Id. at 583.
'" 104 F.R.D. at 566. The magistrate appeared at least tentatively to reject the interven-
ors' first amendment argument based on a strict reading of Seattle Times, concluding that the
first amendment does not affect the trial court's right to restrain dissemination of pretrial
discovery material. Id. As to the common law right of access claim, the magistrate cited to
the rule that the common law right of access is limited only to those documents actually
relied on by a court in reaching its decision. Id. at 567. The magistrate also appeared to be
influenced by the fact that the principal movants were either non-parties or non-represen-
tative class members. Id. at 567 n.5.
"6 Id. at 562.
'" Id at 567.
178 Id.
' 79 Id.
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same party had no constitutional right of access. The Rule 26(c)
issues addressed in Seattle Times thus pertained to a party to the
litigation, who already had access to the confidential material at
issue, and not to the general public. Because of this, the magistrate's
reliance on Seattle Time as a source of support for his opinion that
Rule 26(c) creates a statutory right of access for members of the
general public was, quite simply, misplaced. Disturbingly, however,
this strained construction of Seattle Times and of Rule 26(c) was
affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.'"
The district court's and appeals court's approval of the magis-
trate's suggestion in Agent Orange that Rule 26(c), independent of
the Constitution or the common law, provides a statutory basis for
a public right of access to discovery materials is simply unworkable
in light of the realities of day-to-day trial practice. This is particu-
larly true in the products liability context. It is also at odds with
Rule l's admonition that the Rules should be interpreted "to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 81
Under the Agent Orange courts' reading of Rule 26(c), the general
public would presumably have the right to attend any deposition,
participate in product inspections and testing, and compel the pro-
duction of documents, often numbering in the thousands. Under
the Agent Orange analysis, because it is a statutory "right," non-party
access may be reasonably assured against applications for protective
orders even though the end result inevitably will be additional cost,
delay, frustration, and, perhaps, the intimidation of witnesses and
attorneys. Few corporate employees would be willing to appear as
deponents for their employers under Rule 30(b)(6)' 82 if the local or
national investigative press were expected to be present at the de-
position. 183
At the time of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision
in Agent Orange, it might have been thought that this novel recog-
nition of a "statutory" public right of access under Rule 26(c) would
turn out to be an anomaly. As a highly-publicized multidistrict class
action lawsuit of almost unprecedented proportions, in which the
United States government also was extensively involved, the case
might have been seen as unique and difficult to analogize to other
1 " In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 953 (1987).
In I FED. R. CD/. P. 1.
812 See FED. R. Ow. P. 30(b)(6).
23 See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 118 F.R.D. 252 (D.D.C. 1987) (allowing press to attend
deposition over objection of deponent).
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products liability cases. Moreover, due to the procedural posture of
the case at the time the requests for access to the discovery materials
were made, reasonable arguments for access could conceivably have
been made. These arguments could have been based on the need
of the court and veteran class members to consider the protected
material in evaluating the adequacy of the proposed settlement.' 84
The impact of Agent Orange, however, coming as it did from
one of the most respected of the federal circuits, has already been
felt in other complex litigation. Subsequent to Agent Orange, in a
case involving few of those unique characteristics, except perhaps,
for having a relatively high public profile, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals evidenced its willingness to discern a similar Rule 26(c),
"statutory" right of public access. In Public Citizen v. Liggett Group,
Inc.,'" the court concluded that Public Citizen, a "public interest"
group, had standing to intervene to request modification of a pro-
tective order, notwithstanding its failure to secure Rule 24 inter-
venor status. The court based its conclusion in part on the idea that
a public right of access subsists in Rule 26(c)'s good cause require-
ment. In that-case, the district court was faced with a motion to lift
a protective order to allow access to the discovery documents pro-
duced by the defendant tobacco company. The underlying case, in
which the plaintiffs alleged that cigarettes manufactured by the
defendant had caused their decedent's death, had previously been
dismissed on federal preemption grounds, 186
 and a final judgment
of dismissal had been entered.
After the dismissal, Public Citizen was unable to secure formal
intervenor status under Rule 24 and sought to intervene informally,
asserting a general public right of access. The Public Citizen court
stated that intervention was justified "to relieve the plaintiff of the
burden" of the previously-entered protective order that prevented
it from making the discovery in its possession public.'" In thus
using Rule 26(c) itself as at least a partial independent basis for
allowing intervention by a member of the public, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals actually carried the flawed statutory analysis of
it" See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559,572-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
I " 858 F.2d 775 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 838 (1989); see also United States v.
Kentucky Utils. Co., 124 F.R.D. 146 (E.D. Ky. 1989) (following Agent Orange approach in
antitrust case and permitting disclosure of documents sealed as part of settlement agreement).
1 '6
 See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
I " Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775,784-87 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 838 (1989).
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Agent Orange one step further.'" At best, Rule 26(c) may implicitly
permit a party-opponent to disseminate information obtained
through discovery in the absence of a protective order. Even this
right, however, may be subject to other Rules and limitations, such
as Rule II sanctions if the information was obtained for improper
purposes unconnected to the litigation, or, perhaps, money damages
for its improper, tortious use.
No language in Rule 26(c), however, permits a non-party to
engage in discovery. Indeed, the foundational discovery Rule, Rule
26(a), specifically limits its applicability to "parties." 189 Under the
Rules, a person otherwise unconnected to a case' 9° ordinarily has
no discovery rights whatsoever unless he becomes a party, and at
least until recently, generally has been permitted to do so, if at all,
only under the strictures of Rule 24.' 9 ' The use of Rule 26(c) by
the Agent Orange court, and more recently, by the court in Public
Citizen, to divine a statutory "right" of access, simply cannot be
squared with the other Rules. In their zeal to find grounds for
setting aside umbrella protective orders and allowing broad public
access to discovery materials, these courts, by resorting to Rule 26(c),
have fashioned a rule of procedure that makes no sense and that
will inevitably impose unwarranted costs and hardships on both the
parties and the judicial system.
b. The Statutory "Right" Under Rule 5(d)
The second, and seemingly even less substantial, ground on
which some courts recently have predicated a statutory public right
of access to discovery materials is Rule 5(d). As previously dis-
cussed, 192 Rule 5(d) codifies the normal presumption that all "pa-
pers" after the complaint "required to be served" upon a party will
be filed with the court, but it further states that the court may, "on
10° The Public Citizen court also held that Public Citizen's right to intervene could be
predicated on Rule 5(d). See infra text accompanying notes 192-230 for a discussion of Rule
5(d).
lea
	 FED. R. Cm. P. 26(a).
I" See FED. R. Cr/. P. 27.
10 See FED. R. Civ. P. 24. But see Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1988)
where the Third Circuit Court of Appeals left undisturbed the district court's allowance of
intervention pursuant to an asserted common law presumptive right of access. See supra text
accompanying notes 161-62 for a discussion of Littlejohn.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 81-83, for a discussion of the 1980 amendments
to Rule 5(d).
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motion of a party or on its own initiative" order that such materials
not be filed. 193
In the Agent Orange litigation, the magistrate, in addition to
relying on Rule 26(c) in finding a public right of access, also cited
to Rule 5(d). 194
 The magistrate concluded that Rule 5(d) separately
created a public right of access to the discovery materials in that
case, including materials produced pursuant to Rule 34, 195 even
though the materials had not in fact been filed with the court prior to the
approval of the settlement. The nonfiling of the materials in Agent
Orange was due partially to the lack of any Rule 34 filing
requirement' 96 and partially to the existence of a local rule, then in
force, which reversed the general presumption of Rule 5(d) and
mandated that discovery materials ordinarily not be filed. 197 The
Agent Orange magistrate found support for his position only in the
concluding phrase of the governing local rule, which left open the
possibility that a court could, in individual cases, order the filing of
discovery responses.'" On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals approved this novel reading of Rule 5(d), relying essentially
on the Advisory Committee note accompanying the Rule, which
states that discovery materials "are sometimes of interest to those
who may have no access to them except by a requirement of filing,
such as members of a class, litigants similarly situated, or the public
generally." 199
The Agent Orange analysis makes little sense, either as a reason-
able interpretation of Rule 5(d), or as a statement of the actual
practice of law in the federal courts. Significantly, prior to the
decision in Agent Orange, at least one commentator had labeled the
1983 amendment to Rule 5(d), which reversed the traditional filing
requirement, "misguided" precisely because it was thought that the
amendment would impair public access to discovery materials. 209
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' endorsement of Rule 5(d) as
the basis for a statutory public right of access is also impossible to
193 See FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d).
199 1n re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559,567-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
' 95 See FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
190 See id. Rule 34 requires only that discovery materials be made available for inspection
and copying.
197 S.D.N.Y., E.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 18(a) (1983). 104 F.R.D. at 567-68.
198
 Agent Orange, 104 F.R.D. at 568.
'" In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139,146-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 953 (1987); see FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d) advisory committee's note.
200 See Note, Non-Party Access to Discovery Materials in the Federal Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1085,1095 n.51 (1981).
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reconcile with the fact that documents produced for discovery and
inspection pursuant to Rule 34 document requests cannot properly
be termed "papers" which are "required to be served" within the
meaning of Rule 5(d). 20 ' As noted above, Rule 34, unlike other
Rules governing discovery, does not provide that responsive discov-
ery material be filed with the court and made part of the public
record.
That discovery documents are not "papers" is further evi-
denced by Rule 11's requirement that every "paper of a party
represented by an attorney be signed by at least one attorney of
record."202 The fact that the Rule's drafters never suggested that
documents produced in discovery must be signed under Rule 11
reinforces the conclusion that such documents are not Rule 5(d)
"papers." Indeed, if all discovery materials were to be deemed
"papers" under Rule 5(d), then, pursuant to Rule 7(b)(2), 203 all such
materials not only would have to be signed, but also would have to
be formally captioned and served upon the other party in court.
The fact that none of these procedures is actually followed again
demonstrates the fallacy inherent in equating documents produced
pursuant to Rule 34 with "papers" under Rule 5(d).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Agent Orange acknowl-
edged that discovery documents "technically may not fall within the
terms of Rule 5(d)." 204 But the court also noted that the distinction
between materials filed with a court, and thus presumably public,
and those not filed, and thus presumably private, is much more
than a mere "technicality." 205 The Agent Orange court's use of its
Rule 5(d) supervisory power solely to grant the public at large access
to private information to which it would not otherwise have been
entitled 206 thus seems utterly capricious. It represents a clear de-
parture from the purpose and intent of Rule 5(d), and improperly
casts the court in an investigative—rather than its normal adjudi-
cative—function.
" I FED. R..Civ. P. 5(d).
102 FED. R. Qv. P. U.
"' See FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2).
2" In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 953 (1987).
102
"G As noted above, the district court declined to accept the applicants' first amendment
and common law right of access arguments. See supra note 175 for a discussion of this point.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not address either of these arguments, instead
focusing solely on upholding the statutory right of access. Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 145.
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Several recent state court cases have declined to follow the lead
of Agent Orange, and have refused to interpret their own rules of
procedure regarding filing requirements and protective orders as
the basis for finding a statutory public right of access to discovery
materials. The Florida Supreme Court, for example, has denied
press requests under the state public records laws, or otherwise, to
obtain copies of unfiled depositions in both crimina1207 and civi12°8
proceedings. The Florida Supreme Court has recognized that
"Nransforming the discovery rules into a major vehicle for obtain-
ing information to be published by the press even though the in-
formation might be inadmissible, irrelevant, defamatory or preju-
dicial would subvert the purpose of discovery and result in the tail
wagging the dog."209 Similarly, the Vermont Supreme Court has
declined to recognize a statutory public right of access to unfiled
discovery materials under its state counterpart to Rule 5(d). 210
On the other hand, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' rec-
ognition of a statutory presumption of broad public access to infor-
mation produced during discovery is having an impact on other
complex federal litigation across the country, particularly in the
products liability context. A particularly striking example is Graham
v. Wyeth Laboratories, 21 ' a products liability case brought against the
manufacturer of a DTP vaccine. Following the entry of a verdict
for the plaintiff in Wyeth, the court lifted the protective order pre-
viously entered in favor of the defendant, and then went a step
farther, ordering the creation of a so-called "Wyeth Laboratories
DTP Vaccine Litigation Library. "212 This "library" was to contain
the trial transcript, exhibits, pleadings, depositions, and other dis-
covery documents produced in the case (including documents that
"7 See Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Burk, 504 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1987).
2°9 See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Gridley, 510 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1987).
2°9 Palm Beach, 504 So. 2d at 384. The Palm Beach court also rejected a parallel statutory
argument that the Florida equivalent to Rule 26(c)—Rule 1.280(c)—created a presumptive
public right of access. Id. at 383-84.
210 See Herald Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Conduct Bd., 149 Vt. 233,544 A.2d 596 (1988). In
Herald Association, the subject discovery materials had been sent to the state's Judicial Conduct
Board at the time the request for access was made, but the Board . had not yet ruled as to
whether it would accept them. The court reasoned that the Board could direct that such
discovery information, though already in its possession, be returned to the parties, rendering
it undiscoverable.
2" 118 F.R.D. 511 (D. Kan. 1988).
"Id. at 513-14. The court noted that the defendant no longer produced the vaccine
and reasoned that it was, for that reason, in no jeopardy insofar as competitors are con-
cerned." Id. at 512. On this basis the court concluded that "[f]or all purposes, there are no
secrets." Id.
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had previously been the subject of the protective order)—all for the
benefit of other DTP plaintiffs, as well as for "researchers, academ-
ics, institutions, consumer groups, members of the medical profes-
sion or associations, private or governmental, legal associations such
as the ATLA and/or Defense Research Institute, and even law stu-
dents."2 " The court envisioned an expansion of the "library," in
the future, by way of additional materials supplied by others follow-
ing the trials of successive DTP cases. 2 ' 4
The court justified its action in creating this wholly unprece-
dented "library," which was presumably to be maintained on prem-
ises through the use of public employees and public funds, on the
basis that the Wyeth case "ha[d] it all" regarding the vaccine. 215 The
court wanted to ensure that future litigants and other interested
parties would not be required to "re-invent the wheel. "216 Although
the portion of the district court's order mandating the creation of
the "library" was subsequently vacated by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals on a petition for a writ of mandamus, 2 t 7 the district
court's opinion is notable because it represents perhaps the latest
and most extreme example of judicial overreaching in the wake of
Agent Orange. Although neither Agent Orange nor Rule 5(d) was
actually mentioned by the district court in Wyeth, the idea of the
"library" seems implicitly to follow from the recognition of the
"statutory" right of access, based on Rule 5(d), which formed the
basis for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis in Agent
Orange. But, as the appeals court in Wyeth observed in vacating the
creation of the library, a court's interest in avoiding unnecessary
repetition and expense and in judicial expediency, while perhaps
laudable in the abstract, is improper where it exceeds the bounds
of its judicial authority. 218
Following Agent Orange, at least one other district court has
resorted to local filing rules as a basis for discerning a statutory
public right of access to discovery materials in a products liability
215 Id. at 514.
2 " Id.
215 /d. at 513.
216 Id.
227 Wyeth Labs. v. United States Dist. Court, 851 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1988). The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the portion of the order vacating the protective order,
however, noting that the defendant retained the right to challenge the disclosure of any
material on an individual basis and upon a particularized showing of need.
2222 Id. at 324. The court of appeals specifically questioned whether public funds could
be expended for the contemplated library absent an appropriation by Congress.
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case. In the later case, however, Public Citizen v. Liggett Group,219 the
district court's particularly strained interpretation of Rule 5(d) was
disapproved, at least in part, on appeal. In Public Citizen, Public
Citizen invoked both Rule 26(c) and a local rule as a basis for
informal intervention. 22° Like the local rule involved in Agent Or-
ange, this rule reversed in part the filing presumption of Rule 5(d)
by requiring that discovery materials ordinarily should not be filed
unless the court so orders. 2" Public Citizen also based its access
claim in part on Rule 5(d), arguing that that Rule creates a pre-
sumption that all discovery materials are available to the public if
filed in court. Because the court had already dismissed the case and
good cause for the protective order under Rule 26(c) no longer
existed, Public Citizen argued, the order should be modified and
Rule 5(d) filing required. The district court accepted this argument
and ordered that the documents be filed in court and made available
to the public, despite the fact that the litigation had already been
concluded.
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Public
Citizen's right to intervene based on Rule 5(d) but vacated the part
of the order actually imposing the Rule 5(d) filing requirement.
The court held that while the district court may have had the power
under Rule 5(d) to order the filing of discovery materials during the
pendency of the litigation, its jurisdiction did not extend to post-judg-
ment action. 222 Because the district court, previous to ordering the
filing, had entered a final judgment of dismissal on the merits, no
substantive issue was left to be resolved, and the court simply lacked
the power to impose any new affirmative requirements on the par-
ties relating to discovery. As the appeals court noted, the purpose
of discovery is to enable parties to obtain Material "relevant to the
subject matter in the pending action"—a purpose that can obviously
no longer be served once a case has been dismissed. 223 Indeed, once
a case has been dismissed and rights to appeal have lapsed, parties
are ordinarily under no obligation even to preserve the discovery
materials they have obtained. 224 The First Circuit Court of Appeals'
219 858 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 838 (1989).
229 See supra text accompanying notes 187-91 for a discussion of Rule 26(c).
n' See Local Rule 16(g), U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Mass. Public Citizen also invoked Rule 26(c)
in support of its attempt to intervene.
222 Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 781. The district court had reasoned that the outstanding
protective order presented a live controversy extending past the dismissal of the underlying
claims. See id. at 780.
222 Id. at 781.
224 In Public Citizen, for example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that any
July 1990]	 PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION 	 817
decision in Public Citizen thus correctly recognizes the inherent lim-
itations on the power of a court to order Rule 5(d) filing as a
predicate for the recognition of a statutory public right of access.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Public Citizen court even went so far
as to interpret its local filing rule as according a statutory basis for
intervention by Public Citizen, notwithstanding the latter's failure to
secure formal Rule 24 intervenor status, represents a troubling
extension of Rule 5(d).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Littlejohn v. BIC Corp.225
seems to have rejected—if only implicitly—the Agent Orange ap-
proach of using court filing procedures as a justification for dis-
cerning a public right of access to materials covered by a protective
order. As previously discussed, 226 the Littlejohn court did recognize
the existence of a public right of access based on the common law,
at least with respect to confidential documents actually admitted,
although erroneously, into evidence at trial. The court further held,
however, that because the petition for intervention by the Philadel-
phia Inquirer (PNI) came some five months after the case had been
settled and dismissed, with no appeal pending, and after the con-
fidential exhibits had already been returned to the parties, the
documents could no longer be considered "judicial records" to
which a right of access could attach. In recognizing that both his-
torically and as a matter of common sense the content of a judicial
record has both temporal and substantive limits, 227 the Littlejohn
court impliedly recognized that it is not the business of courts to
serve as permanent repositories of information available for mem-
bers of the public and the press to access at their convenience. The
court stated:
In this era of "the paper chase," hundreds of thousands
of exhibits may be subpoenaed and entered into evidence
of the parties were free to destroy all of the documents in their possession long before Public
Citizen filed its motion and that, had they done so, any Rule 5(d) filing order would obviously
have been meaningless and unavailing. Id.
225 851 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1988).
426 See supra text accompanying notes 161-64 for a discussion of the Littlejohn case.
227 Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 682. The court observed that under 28 U.S.C. § 457, obsolete
papers may be disposed of with approval of court. Of further significance to the Littlejohn
court was the existence of a local rule that provided that the district court has custody over
all exhibits received into evidence but also stated that these exhibits are considered only
"auxiliary case records," to be taken from the clerk's custody at the conclusion of the case.
Local Rule 39(e), U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Pa. (1986). The court reasoned that if the exhibits had
not been so returned by the time of the intervention, they already would have been destroyed
by the district court clerk, and could no longer be a part of the judicial record subject to
presumptive public access. Id.
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in bulk in a single case . . . (citations omitted). Must a
court be forever burdened with the responsibility of main-
taining, supervising the possession of, or adjudicating ac-
cess rights of such documentary exhibits? We believe not.
This is an unreasonable burden to inflict upon courts,
particularly at a time when litigation continues to grow
more complex and voluminous. 228
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals also pointed out in Little-
john that the purposes of public access, while perhaps served during
the trial period and while a case is pending in court, are no longer
served once the litigation has been completely concluded. 229
 The
Littlejohn court never explicitly rejected or even considered the sta-
tutory right of access approach under Rule 5(d) that was first rec-
ognized in Agent Orange. The Littlejohn determination that confiden-
tial materials—including even trial exhibits returned to their owner
after a case has been terminated by settlement—do not retain their
status as Judicial records" to which a presumptive public right of
access may attach, does appear at odds with the Agent Orange ap-
proach. The Littlejohn approach, however, represents a far more
sensible accommodation of the needs of both the parties and the
system. 230
22" Id. at 682-83; see also Simon v. C.D. Searle & Co., 119 F.R.D. 683, 684 (D. Minn.
1987) (noting that the court had never sanctioned the wholesale filing of discovery materials,
depositions or exhibits, and declining to recognize a public right of access to documents
never admitted into evidence or ruled on by the court); cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 899 n.63 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("We have serious doubts that
a member of the public could acquire access under the common law rule to materials already
restored to their owner.").
229 Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 682. The court noted that public access serves "to promote
trustworthiness of the judicial process, to curb judicial abuses, and to provide the public with
a more complete understanding of the system." Id. PNI had also argued in Littlejohn that,
notwithstanding the termination of the underlying suit, the district court still had supervisory
power over the documents because copies had been resubmitted to the court under seal in
connection with ancillary contempt proceedings against the plaintiff's attorney. The court
rejected this argument, observing that PNI had not intervened to secure access to the record
of the contempt proceedings. Rather, PNI had sought access only to the records in the
underlying case. Id. at 683 n.24.
23° Id. at 683. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals left untouched the district court's
determination that PNI was entitled to obtain items that properly remained a part of the
judicial record, such as deposition testimony read into evidence at trial or exhibits actually
made a part of the official court transcript. Id.; see also Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co.,
724 F.2d 1010, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (presumption of openness created by Rule 5(d) is
qualified by Rule 26(c)(7)'s protection of confidential information and by litigant's constitu-
tionally protected interest in avoiding public disclosure of sensitive commercial information
not used at trial).
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V. THE PLAINTIFF'S "RIGHT" TO DISSEMINATE
Although courts sometimes confuse or combine the two ideas,
a plaintiff's purported right to disseminate discovery materials must
be analyzed separately from the public's purported right of access
to them. Protective orders that put limitations on how a person may
share discovered information raise more obvious first amendment
issues than do limitations on access; a judicial limitation on a per-
son's ability to disseminate information obtained through discovery
is, at least ostensibly, a restraint on speech. As the Supreme Court
stated in Seattle Times, however, because the discovery process itself
is a matter of legislative "grace," it is not the type of "classic" prior
restraint that requires exacting first amendment scrutiny. 2"
As discussed above, the scope of a party's first amendment
rights must be determined by reference to the statutory scheme of
the Rules. Because the one circumscribed purpose of discovery
under the Rules is to facilitate trial preparation, a party's interest
in disseminating information obtained through discovery must be
constrained by this single purpose. Instead of using a strict scrutiny
test, the Seattle Times court formulated a special test to determine
whether protective orders that limit dissemination by plaintiffs pass
constitutional muster. Under Seattle Times, a "litigant has no first
amendment right of access to information made available only for
purposes of trying his suit." 232
 Thus, a protective order will not
offend the first amendment so long as it is entered within the
requirements conferred by Rule 26(c); is limited to the context of
pretrial discovery; and does not restrict the dissemination of infor-
mation obtained outside the discovery process. 233
Seattle Times holds that a protective order that fulfills the "good
cause" requirement of Rule 26(c) will, by virtue of its compliance
23 ' See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20,32-34 (1984). Under the "strict scrutiny"
test, a prior restraint on speech will not offend the first amendment if the harm posed by
the restrained speech is substantial and serious; the restraint is narrowly drawn and precise;
and there is no alternative means of protecting the public interest that intrudes less directly
on expression. See generally Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,562-63 (1976).
232 Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32.
233 See id. at 34-35. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Seattle Times. Under the third prong of the Seattle Times test, it is clear that the dissemination
of information received independently of the discovery process cannot be prohibited. See, e.g.,
In re Rafferty, 864 F.2d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (magistrate exceeded scope of authority by
placing under protective order materials obtained prior to discovery); see also Kirshner v.
Uniden Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d 1074,1080-81 (9th Cir. 1988) (district court abused discretion
in issuing a protective order purporting to restrict use of documents obtained by plaintiff's
attorney in separate action earlier filed against same defendant on behalf of another client).
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with that Rule, be constitutional. Unfortunately, despite the clarity
of its stated holding, Seattle Times has done little to resolve the
confusion about how the first amendment impacts on a plaintiff's
right to share discovery information. 234 The main reason for this
confusion is probably the Court's reluctance to disregard completely
the first amendment in its analysis. While it refused to subject the
protective order under review itself to strict scrutiny, it analyzed the
rule pursuant to which it was entered—Rule 26(c)—using a classic
strict scrutiny analysis. 235 Thus, although the Seattle Times Court
clearly held that protective orders that limit information-sharing by
plaintiffs are not classic prior restraints, the use of classic strict
scrutiny in analyzing Rule 26(c)—the type of scrutiny used to ana-
lyze prior restraints—has created some troublesome ambiguity. 236
As a result of this ambiguity, lower courts that have tried to
follow Seattle Times disagree on the extent to which an anti-dissem-
ination protective order must be viewed as a prior restraint on
2" See, e.g., Comment, Mass Products Liability Litigation, supra note 13; Note, "Good Cause",
supra note 13; Note, Effect on Discovery Sharing, supra note 13.
232
 The Court acknowledged that pretrial discovery creates "significant potential for -
abuse," in the form of delay, expense and potential violations of privacy, and that the
government has a substantial interest in preventing abuse of the judicial process. Seattle Times,
467 U.S. at 34. The Court thus reasoned that Congress was justified when it empowered
trial courts, through Rule 26(c), to enter anti-dissemination protective orders; because the
government's interest in preventing abuses of the judicial process is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of expression, Rule 26(c) does not offend the first amendment. See also id. at 37-38 ("Mt
is necessary to consider . . . whether 'the limitation of First Amendment freedoms (is) no
greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved...) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
226 Another poSsible reason for the ambiguity generated by Seattle Times may be that
disclosure in the case could have abridged the first amendment religious and associational
freedoms of the plaintiffs, a point specifically emphasized by Justice Brennan in his concur-
ring opinion: "[R]espondent's interests in privacy and religious freedom are sufficient to
justify this protective order and to overcome the protections afforded free expression by the
First Amendment." Id. at 38 (Brennan, J., concurring). This has led some commentators to
conclude that trial courts may accord greater deference to the first amendment claims of a
party seeking to disseminate where the opposing party has not asserted a competing consti-
tutional claim. See, e.g., Note, Use of Discovery Materials, supra note 13, at 180-83, 194-96.
The majority opinion by Justice Powell, however, only briefly acknowledged the conflict
between the defendant's first amendment interests and the plaintiff's privacy and religious
freedom interests. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 37 n.24. Further, nothing in the opinion
indicates that the Court viewed the existence of such a competing constitutional claim as
fundamental to its determination that the defendant had no right to disseminate.
Another commentator has suggested that Seattle Times should be viewed as tightening
the rules only for dissemination to the general public, but not for information-sharing among
litigants per se, because the party against whom the protective order was sought in that case
was a newspaper that already had revealed its intention to publish the information for general
circulation. See Note, Effect on Discovery Sharing, supra note 13, at 1069. This interpretation,
however, is difficult to square with the Court's own explicit articulation of its holding.
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protected speech. As previously noted, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals applies a simple, less stringent "good cause" test to protec-
tive orders, and reads Seattle Times to prohibit a court issuing or
reviewing a protective order from considering the first amendment
at al1. 237 But the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Seattle
Times does not permit, let alone mandate, a court issuing a protective
order to ignore the first amendment, and continues to require that
courts apply a "heightened scrutiny" within Rule 26(c)'s require-
ment of good cause. 238
Clearly, any asserted first amendment interest of a plaintiff who
wishes to disseminate discovery information in order to influence
the outcome of the pending litigation is entitled to no weight, because
there can be scant first amendment interest in promoting a trial
through the media. As the Supreme Court has stated, "trials are
not like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall,
the radio, and the newspaper."239 Indeed, when dissemination of
the fruits of discovery by a plaintiff during the original action
impinges on the defendant's ability to obtain an impartial jury or a
fair trial, serious questions of professional responsibility may be
raised.24° As previously discussed, however, most courts have held
that a plaintiff's stated desire to share information with plaintiffs
in related lawsuits, standing alone, does not give rise to "good cause"
233 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987); New York v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 771 F.2d 796, 802
(3d Cir. 1985); see also Oklahoma Hosp. Ass'n v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 748 F.2d 1421,
1424 (10th Cir. 1984); Worrell Newspapers, Inc. v. Westhafer, 739 F.2d 1219, 1223-24 n.4
(7th Cir. 1984); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 737 F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (D.C. Cir.
1984). For a criticism of the approach of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Cipollone,
see Note, Protective Orders Prohibiting Publication of Information Obtained Through Discovery, 32
Vita.. L. REV. 813, 833 (1987) {hereinafter Note, Information Obtained Through Discovery]
(arguing that the case "achieves a resolution of the ambiguity in Seattle Times by a kind of
judicial fiat and not by a resolution, in theory, of the conflicting principles that generated
it").
238 Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d I, 7 (1st Cir. 1986). Although the First Circuit
Court of Appeals stated in Anderson that the Seattle Times test is not as stringent as the one
the First Circuit had previously adopted in In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 115-16
(1st Cir. 1981), which had called for "heightened scrutiny" of an order restraining commu-
nication, see Anderson, 805 F.2d at 5-6, as a practical matter it is difficult to discern the
difference between the tests used in Anderson and San Juan Star. See also Michelson v. Daly,
590 F. Supp. 261, 266 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (Seattle Times requires separate inquiry into whether
restriction is no greater than necessary to protect public interest).
232 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941).
248 Disciplinary Rule 7-107(G) of the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility strictly
prohibits communicating certain information about civil litigation if the information is likely
to be disseminated by means of public communication.
822	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:771
under Rule 26(c). 24 i Due to the growing trend of selling informa-
tion, often at a profit, among members of the plaintiff's bar, 242
information marketing among plaintiffs' attorneys has become big
business.243
 As a result, constitutional challenges to protective orders
by plaintiffs' experts or by the attorneys themselves may no longer
be too far-fetched. 244
 But, to the extent that a protective order that
541 See supra note 58 and accompanying text for a discussion of litigation that is of public
interest.
242 See, e.g., In re Upjohn Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Litig., 81 F.R.D. 482 (E.D. Mich.
1979), aff'd, 664 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1981) (approving sale of discovery information to other
plaintiffs under court supervision). But see Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d
630 (8th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff's attorney held in contempt for selling discovery information
to plaintiffs in other toxic shock syndrome case while initial case was on appeal).
243
 Most commonly, individual litigants learn of similar suits elsewhere and contact in-
volved parties seeking information that those parties may have obtained through discovery.
Sometimes, parties or their lawyers form strategy groups to devise a coordinated discovery
plan that includes provisions for sharing discovery fruits between all group members. See,
e.g., Rheingold, The MER/29 Story—An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF.
L. REv. 116, 122 (1968) (describing meeting of plaintiffs' lawyers at the American Trial
Lawyers Association (ATLA) meeting to discuss coordinated strategy in products liability
cases involving prescription drug MER/29). Another method of information sharing is
through established information exchanges, such as the ATLA Exchange, which are cen-
tralized data banks where discovered information is collected and made available to members.
Litigants almost always must pay for the information, and the price is sometimes set at a
level that ensures a profit for the discovering party's attorney. See generally Note, Effect on
Discovery Sharing, supra note 13, at 1057-58.
The Trial Lawyers for Public Justice (TLPJ), a law firm established by ATLA members
for the purpose of filing amicus briefs and creating an information sharing network, main-
tains various clearinghouses through which it sells discovery information. For example, the
"Airbag Clearinghouse" sells discovery materials to plaintiffs' attorneys in cases that allege
that a motor vehicle has a design defect if it does not contain an airbag. TLPJ charges $1200,
plus five percent of the contingency fee, plus the cost of producing any updated material.
1984 ANN. REP. OF THE TRIAL LAWYERS FOR PUB. JUSTICE. Information sharing is neither
forbidden nor authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Selling discovery material in exchange for a portion of the contingency fee is unethical
in states that prohibit referral fees. Hour the Plaintiff's Bar Shares Its Information, NAT'L L.J.,
July 23, 1984. Moreover, the outright sale of discovery materials may be ethically dubious
for other reasons. Canon 5 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility requires
a lawyer to exercise independent judgment on behalf of a client. A lawyer who will benefit
financially from the sale of discovery material is unlikely to exercise the proper judgment
required by Canon 5 with regard to whether he should agree to a protective order prohibiting
its dissemination. On the other hand, some commentators believe that the sale of such
information, if agreed to by the selling lawyer's client, will be ethically sound. Id.
2" Retained experts are generally required to sign affidavits acknowledging that they
have read the protective order and agree to be bound by it before they are shown the material
covered by the order, and a violation of the order may result in a finding of contempt. See,
e.g., Quinter v. Volkswagen . of Am., 676 F.2d 969, 974 (3d Cir. 1982) (upholding contempt
finding against expert who disclosed material under protective order to counsel who retained
him to assist in preparation of another case against same defendant); see also American
Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, No. WD-89-54 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1990), where the expert,
an engineer who had also worked as in-house counsel for American Motors Corporation,
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limits dissemination implicates a plaintiff's first amendment inter-
ests, those rights are frequently counterbalanced by the defendant's
right to a fair trial—a trial free from massive, emotionally-charged
publicity245—and by legitimate interests in corporate privacy. 246
Limitations on a plaintiff's first amendment right to dissemi-
nate may also frequently be warranted to ensure the smooth oper-
ation of the discovery system by avoiding the glut of protective
order litigation that would otherwise inundate the courts. While
courts have tended to endorse information-sharing among plaintiffs
left the company and later attempted to use information learned in the course of his review
of cases for the defendant as a retained expert For plaintiffs.
An expert might argue that he cannot be precluded from using confidential information
in testifying because he has a fundamental right to pursue his profession and a corresponding
professional duty to reveal to his clients what he knows and cannot cleave from his memory.
Cf. In re Upjohn Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Litig., 81 F.R.D. 482, 483-84 (E.D. Mich.
1979) (suggesting that it could result in a violation of medical ethics for an expert who knows
the hazards of a drug to conceal that knowledge from others), aff'd, 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.
1981). At least one court has noted, however, that the idea that an expert witness is auto-
matically entitled to act as a "self-appointed savior" carries with it the "seed of abuse." Bairn
& Blank, Inc. v. Bruno-New York, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 346, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see Marcus, supra
note 2, at 67-68.
A plaintiff's attorney subject to a protective order in one case might find himself with a
similarly situated plaintiff in a subsequent case and argue that the protective order deprives
him, without due process, of his ability adequately to represent the subsequent plaintiff. But
see Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 438-39, 441 (1979) (out-of-state counsel's right to appear pro
hac vice on behalf of client is not among those interests protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause, nor is such privilege a constitutionally protected property right);
Northern Pa. Legal Servs., Inc. v. County of Lackawanna, 513 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Penn.
1981) (an attorney has no property interest in representing a particular client absent an
express or implied contract with a governmental entity). To date, no court appears to have
been called upon to decide any due process claim of this type.
One possible line of defense against such claims, which conceivably may represent the
wave of the future in products liability cases (particularly where plaintiffs seek to modify
existing protective orders) involves the federal copyright laws. One federal court already has
judicially approved the extension of copyright protection to documents found to be trade
secrets under state law. Honda Research & Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Loveall, 687 F. Supp. 355 (E.D.
Tenn. 1985, 1987); see Loveall v. American Honda Motor Inc., 694 S.W.2d 937 (Tenn. 1985)
(state case finding defendant entitled to protective order limiting dissemination of competi-
tively sensitive information regarding developmental procedures, specifications and testing
of all-terrain cycle). As a result of this federal court's decision, the Tennessee state court
prohibited the plaintiff's lawyer from disclosing to any third parties copyrighted trade secret
testing documents that were obtained in the course of discovery. Presumably, once such
documents became copyrighted, the plaintiff's attorney also could be enjoined from distrib-
uting the protected documents to lawyers for other (or potential) parties litigating claims
against the same copyright holder.
"5
 See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir. 1983).
"fl See, e.g., Krause v. Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212, 217 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823
(1982); Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 480-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also
Comment, The Constitutional Right to Withhold Private Information, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 536 (1982).
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as economical and efficient, 247 in the long run information sharing
may actually waste judicial time and resources. Defendants faced
with the prospect that documents produced in one case will generate
similar claims throughout the country will more aggressively resist
disclosure. In addition, a protective order that conclusively deter-
mines that a particular set of documents is confidential in the initial
case will presumably make the issue of confidentiality res judicator in
any subsequent case. By contrast, an order that is open to modifi-
cation so as to allow information sharing is subject to repeated
challenges to confidentiality in subsequent litigation.'"
Sharing information, on the representation that those with
whom the information is shared agree to be bound by the terms of
the protective order entered in the initial case, may also, as a prac-
tical matter, raise serious problems of policing and enforcement.
Even some proponents of discovery sharing acknowledge this dif-
ficulty. 24° First, the likelihood of violation, inadvertent or otherwise,
will increase in direct proportion to the number of disclosures. 25°
Once the information has been transferred beyond the limits of the
jurisdiction where it was originally discovered, the court's contempt
power will no longer reach those in its possession. Moreover, or-
ganized information exchange among the plaintiff's bar enables
plaintiffs in lawsuits across the country to use the same experts for
similar types of suits. The corporate defendant in a products liability
247 See MANUAL. FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 3.11 (5th ed. 1982); see also Burlington City
Bd. of Educ. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 115 . F.R.D. 188, 191 (M.D.N.C. 1987)
(permitting exchange of videotaped depositions among plaintiffs' attorneys). But see Forest
Oil Corp. v. Tenneco, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 321, 323 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (modification denied where
plaintiffs in collateral cases sought access to discovery documents after they had already
obtained discovery in other cases).
2" See Sherman & Kinnard, Federal Court Discovery in the BO's, Making the Rules Work, 95
F.R.D. 245 (1982). Discovery sharing may also burden the system by creating "canned"
evidence that may be inappropriate in another lawsuit or which may even be of questionable
authenticity. Cf. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Revlon, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 632 (D. Del. 1987).
In Cedars-Sinai, the plaintiff, at the conclusion of a case, sought an amendment to a protective
order to require the defendant's counsel to retain confidential materials that had been
produced by it in discovery and had already been returned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff
wanted the documents retained and centrally located in the event that it needed them for
future lawsuits. The court noted that the plaintiff failed to show that the documents had
bearing or would bear on any other proceeding. The court denied the plaintiff's motion,
stating that it would not grant a discovery request for documents that had no relevance to
any case presently before it "simply because the documents may one day prove to be relevant
in another action, possibly in another court." Id. at 633.
2" See, e.g., Comment, Mass Products Liability Litigation, supra note 13, at 1149-50.
25(' See Anderson, How to Use Protective Orders to Safeguard Confidential Information, 32
PRAC. LAW. 23, 26 (1986).
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action who produces confidential information in one case, in one
state, may have produced that information in every case nationwide,
because information that an expert learns may become a permanent
part of his memory. 25 ' Finally, the plaintiff who seeks to share
discovery information for use in other cases may further frustrate
attempts to limit dissemination by persuading the court in the sub-
sequent case to enjoin the defendant from enforcing the protective
order issued in the previous case. 252
Although the Constitution requires states to give full faith and
credit to the "judicial proceedings" of sister states, 255
 the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the full faith and credit clause has spoken
in terms of the credit due to final judgments. 254 The success of a
full faith and credit argument to enforce a protective order from
another jurisdiction may therefore depend on whether or not the
issuing state classifies the order as a judgment. Even where there is
no final judgment, however, principles of comity will weigh in favor
of enforcing a protective order issued by a foreign court. 255
At the very least, a litigant who consents to the entry of a
protective order and later seeks its modification should be held to
have waived any first amendment interests in disclosure. As a lead-
ing commentator has noted, such negotiated protective orders are,
in fact, "archetypal waivers:"
They are intelligent because they result from consultations
between client and lawyer and voluntary because the party
seeking discovery has no duty to consent to them. Protec-
tive orders save the litigant seeking production of confi-
dential information the time and money that discovery
disputes would entail and ensure that he will receive in-
formation that a court might otherwise decline to order
prod uced. 256
251 See supra note 244 for a discussion of expert witnesses.
252 See, e.g., Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343 (Tex, 1987). In Garcia the survivor of an
automobile accident instituted a state court products liability action, based on a design defect
in the car's fuel system, against the automobile manufacturer. The court permitted wholesale
distribution of voluminous discovery documents relating to fuel system integrity even though
the information was protected by protective orders in other cases in other jurisdictions.
255 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. A similar rule is imposed on the federal courts with regard
to state court judgments by the statute implementing the full faith and credit clause, 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
254 Thomas v, Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 271 (1980).
255
	 e.g„ Dart Indus. v. Liquid Nitrogen Processing Corp., 50 F.R.D. 286 (D. Del.
1970).
256 Marcus, supra note 2, at 69; see also Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d
1001, 1006 (3d Cir. 1976) (suggesting in dicta that parties and counsel who take advantage
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Thus, where the proposed modification affects a protective order
to which the parties have stipulated, the shared and explicit as-
sumption that discovery was for the purposes of that case alone
ought, to go a long way toward denying a plaintiff's request for
modification. 257
 Courts should refuse to endorse the tactic of some
plaintiffs "of inducing broad disclosure under a set of ground rules
and of then avoiding any limitations on itself by asking the court to
come in and change those rules."258
 As a leading commentator has
noted, lilt is astonishing in thi., era of litigation boom and discovery
crisis to suggest that information-gathering is a legitimate purpose
for litigation." 259
The Supreme Court has plainly indicated that when the pur-
pose of a discovery request is to gather information for use in
proceedings other than the pending suit, discovery should be alto-
gether denied. 26° The outright sale of discovery materials may be
ethically dubious at best. 26 ' The practice may even set the stage for
certain judicial abuses, such as barratry. Nonetheless, in a growing
number of cases, particularly in the products liability context, it
appears that plaintiffs may be initiating litigation and discovery
primarily to obtain information, to find a wrong and report on it,
and only secondarily to obtain judicial relief. 262
 Because of this, it is
becoming increasingly important for courts to be sensitive to the
interests of defendants in the reliability of anti-dissemination pro-
tective orders.
of the discovery process implicitly waive their first amendment rights to freely disseminate
information thereby obtained). The traditional definition of waiver in the constitutional
context requires the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See generally Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV.
478 (1981).
2" See, e.g., Omega Homes, Inc. v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 656 F. Supp. 393, 395 (W.D.
Va. 1987) (modification denied in antitrust case); see afro Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v.
Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 264, 267 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
255 Omega Homes, 656 F. Supp. at 404.
255
 Marcus, supra note 2, at 53.
'° Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352-53 n.17 (1978); see also Wilk
v. American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
261 See supra note 243. Although the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility does not
directly address the sale of discovery materials, the sale of such materials may raise doubts
about a lawyer's ability to exercise independent professional judgment as is required under
Canon 5. See Note, Use of Discovery Materials, supra note 13, at 201. But see Comment, Mass
Products Liability Litigation, supra note 13, at 1155-56 (arguing that any divergence of interests
between attorney and client in such cases is likely to be no greater than that inherent in any
contingency fee arrangement).
262 See Levitt, Keeping Secrets Secret, 13 LITIGATION 10 (Fall 1986).
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As previously discussed, uncontrolled dissemination of propri-
etary information presents unacceptable hazards to the rights of
defendants. Particularly in products liability cases, plaintiffs often
routinely move to modify protective orders at the close of litigation,
and courts sometimes seem to losë sight of the fact that information-
sharing, while perhaps generally consistent with the directive of
Rule 1, at least when shared with other plaintiffs, is not specifically
authorized by the Rules. Free dissemination of discovery materials,
whether to other plaintiffs, to the press, or to other members of
the public, threatens to taint the fairness of the civil justice pro-
cess. 265 As one commentator has noted "[T]he speculative possibility
that in some cases the public would benefit from dissemination of
information garnered through discovery hardly warrants the con-
version of the process into an investigatory tool for inquisitive liti-
gants. "264
Where the parties have not stipulated to the protective order,
this waiver analysis is less than fully applicable. 265 Even then, how-
ever, the Rule 1 and privacy interest protected by the entry of the
protective order may be entitled to considerable weight when bal-
anced against the relatively weak interests of the vast majority of
plaintiffs in dissemination.' Moreover, adopting a waiver approach
to the plaintiff's right to disseminate discovery information covered
by a protective order does not require that courts automatically deny
plaintiffs the right to disseminate. It only precludes them from
daiming that they have an absolute first amendment right to do so,
thus permitting courts to give adequate consideration to the inter-
ests of defendants and the interests of Rule 1. 266
VI. THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND STANDARDS FOR
MODIFICATION •
As should already be apparent from the foregoing discussion,
the first amendment issues that arise when dissemination of discov-
ered information is restricted before trial change as the litigation
advances. Confidential information that is used at trial goes into the
public domain unless it is submitted under seal or reviewed in camera
2" Marcus, supra note 2, at 57.
2" Id.
"5 See id. at 69-72; Note, Information Obtained Through Discovery, supra note 237, at 843.
281% See Marcus, supra note 2, at 72; see also, Note, Information Obtained Through Discovery,
supra note 237, at 843-53 (proposing a "forfeiture analysis" to evaluate a plaintiff's first
amendment right to disseminate in the context of a non-stipulated protective order).
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by the court, or unless the protective order is clearly reasserted at
trial and drafted to include prohibitions against further dissemi-
nation after tria1. 267
Even information that has not been disclosed before the con-
clusion of the litigation may be subject to less protection after a
judgment has been entered because several of the typical grounds
for "good cause," such as the need to ensure a fair trial, will by then
have been eliminated. In Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 268 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the denial of a petition for contempt filed
against a plaintiff's attorney for failing to return copies of confi-
dential documents covered by a protective order after the settlement
and dismissal of the case. The court, noting that neither of the
parties seemed to have treated the protective order as dispositive
of the confidentiality of the documents admitted at trial, held that
the presumptive public right of access to the deposition testimony
and exhibits admitted into evidence outweighed any interests of the
defendant in continued secrecy.269
But while courts undoubtedly do have inherent power to mod-
ify protective orders, it is far less clear which party bears the burden
of persuasion as to modification, and what the appropriate stan-
dards for modification are. The confusing split of authority in this
area has generated substantial uncertainty, and has made it increas-
ingly difficult for defendants, especially in the products liability
context, to rely on the continued validity of their protective orders.
The courts' inability to agree on the burden of persuasion is
evident even in some of the early cases. In Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern
Electric Sales Co.,27° for example, the plaintiff sought to abrogate a
confidentiality agreement composed of an agreement by the parties
and a ruling by the court pursuant to the forerunner to Rule 26(c),
which also required a showing of good cause. The court held that
it was incumbent on the defendants—the beneficiaries of the pro-
"7 See National Polymer Prods., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1981);
see also Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1988). On the other hand, some courts
have held that a protective order that specifies that the protected documents can be used
"only in the present lawsuit" protects the documents even after they are used at trial. Harris
v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1985).
"8
 851 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1988).
269
 Id. at 686. On remand, the district court also held that the attorney's reasonable and
good faith, though erroneous, belief that a particular document had been admitted into
evidence did not warrant a finding of contempt for retaining a copy of that document in
violation of the protective order. Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 697 F. Supp. 192, 194 (E.D. Pa.
1988).
470
 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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tective order—to show "good cause" why the information should
not be made public."' By contrast, in American Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. Grady, 272 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
"exceptional considerations" warranted the alteration of a stipulated
protective order, thus signifying that it is the party seeking modi-
fication who bears the burden of persuasion, and that the burden
is a heavy one.273 More recently, some lower courts appear to have
adopted a "balancing test," considering such factors as the nature
and purpose of the original protective order, the degree of reliance
on the order by the protected party, the purpose and status of the
party requesting modification, and the role, if any, of the govern-
ment in the dispute. 274 To date, however, none of the circuit courts
of appeals have explicitly adopted any such framework, and some
recent decisions suggest that the burden may increasingly be falling
on defendants to justify, on a document-by-document basis, their
continued need for protection.
Once again, this trend seems largely to have been spearheaded
by the decision of the magistrate in Agent Orange, adopted by the
district court and implicitly endorsed by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals. 275 In Agent Orange, the magistrate held squarely that it
is the protected party who must bear the burden of showing that
"good cause" continues so as to warrant the maintenance of the
protective order. 276 This represented a clear break from prior prec-
edent in the Second Circuit, which had required the party seeking
to modify a protective order to show a "compelling need" or "ex-
traordinary circumstances" warranting the modification."' Al-
though the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in affirming
Agent Orange, did not directly reach the issue whether the magistrate
below had applied the correct standard of proof, the opinion clearly
271
972 594 F.2d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979).
476 See also Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Bagley, 601 F.2d 949 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 907 (1979). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, later repudiated the
"exceptional circumstances" approach of Grady in Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d
1295, 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
224 See, e.g., H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 106 F.R.D. 551, 554 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); see also Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Department of Transp., 107 Wash. 2d 872, 734
P.2d 480 (1987).
"5 In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab, Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 821
F.2d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987).
226 See id. at 568-70.
2" See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982);
Martindell v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979).
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leaves open the possibility that the standard adopted by the mag-
istrate may be found acceptable in future cases. 278 Not surprisingly,
that lesser standard has subsequently been employed by at least one
other district court in the Second Circuit. 279 -
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, relying heavily on Agent
Orange, has also suggested a willingness to abandon the "extraor-
dinary circumstances" standard for modifying protective orders in
favor of a far less restrictive standard. In Public Citizen v. Liggett
Group,28° while noting that it "need not decide the matter defini-
tively," the court strongly suggested that more lenient standards for
modification may be appropriate in cases other than those in which
the government, which already has at its disposal special investiga-
tory powers not available to private litigants, is the party seeking
access. 281
 The court suggested that in a products liability suit in-
volving only private parties, modification could be ordered so long
as "the reasons underlying the initial promulgation of the order in
respect to the particular document no longer exist," and addition-
ally, so long as the district court is able to make a "reasoned deter-
mination that public interest considerations favored allowing coun-
sel to make those particular documents public." 282 The Public Citizen
court held that because the case had been dismissed on the merits,
thereby eliminating the possibility of trial, there was a "significant
"8 See Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 146-47. The court assumed without deciding that the
traditional Second Circuit standard, imposing on the party seeking modification the burden
of showing extraordinary circumstances, applied, and stated that that burden had been
satisfied. Id.
"9 See Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros., 122 F.R.D. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (allowing
challenges to deposition confidentiality designations where no good cause was shown in first
instance). But see Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1987)
(post-Agent Orange non-products liability case where Second Circuit Court of Appeals em-
ployed traditional "extraordinary circumstances" standard).
"9
 858 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 838 (1989).
Id. at 791. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit distinguished Martindell, 594
F.2d 291, and Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1985), two previous cases that
had applied the extraordinary circumstances test, as cases involving governmental interven-
tion. See Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 791. Martindell involved an attempt by the United States
government as prosecutor to shortcut its normal investigatory procedures by obtaining sealed
depositions in a shareholder derivative suit to which it was not a party, after witnesses had
testified pursuant to a protective order without first invoking their privilege against self-
incrimination. See Martindell, 594 F.2d 291. Palmieri involved a request by New York State to
intervene in a private antitrust action to access sealed settlement documents. See Palmieri, 779
F.2d 861; see also H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 106 F.R.D. 551 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); cf. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1300 (7th Cir. 1980) (granting
State of New York access to sensitive discovery materials on the basis that it did not have the
same "awesome" discovery tools as the federal government).
292
 Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 791-92.
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change in circumstances calling into question the necessity of the
protective order." 285 The point of the protective order, the court
reasoned, "was to promote a fair trial, not to guarantee [the defen-
dant] perpetual secrecy. "284
Both the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Agent Orange and
the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Public Citizen further justified
their approach to modification on the fact that the defendants in
those cases had never been required to demonstrate good cause in
the first instance for the issuance of the umbrella protective orders.
Both courts acknowledged that umbrella orders, by extending
broad protection to all documents produced, serve to expedite dis-
covery. 285 But the courts still seemed to take the position that such
orders "are by nature overinclusive and are, therefore, peculiarly
subject to later modification."286
The new approach to modification exhibited by the Courts of
Appeals for the First and Second Circuits, and apparently now
being followed by a number of other courts, 287 is problematic be-
cause of the nearly insurmountable burden it imposes on products
liability defendants. These defendants, having once produced vo-
luminous discovery materials in response to a plaintiff's request,
may apparently now be called upon at any time to justify their
continuing need for protection from the public and the press. This
burden is particularly onerous given that the court is required to
consider, among other issues, the extent to which the materials and
information may have become stale in the interim. 288 It seems un-
2"3 Id. at 790.
284
 Id.; cf. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139,147 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 953 (1987), where the court justified modification in part on the fact that the
protective order, by its terms, was applicable solely to the pretrial stages of the litigation.
283 Public Citizen , 858 F.2d at 790; Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 148.
586 Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 790; Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 148 ("[H]ad the district court
not lifted the orders, we would be compelled to find that the orders had been improvidently
granted because the district court never required appellants to make the requisite good cause
showing.").
232 See, e.g., Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1988); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 822 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1987) (allowing modification where magistrate failed to
make specific written findings as to good cause); United States v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 124
F.R.D. 146 (E.D. Ky. 1989); Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros., 122 F.R.D. 433 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Sharjah Inv. Co. (UK) Ltd. v. P.C. Telemart, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34 (C.D.
Cal. 1984).
288 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dilemma of
trying to protect outdated information. One commentator has observed that the logic behind
the courts' "dated matter" approach to protective orders would seem to undermine almost
all protective orders entered into as part of a settlement package because a party could almost
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likely that corporate documents and information about the design,
manufacture, and distribution of products placed in the stream of
commerce many years before the discovery process began will often
be able to withstand a non-party's challenge on staleness grounds
made months or years after the litigation has been terminated. 289
Yet, as previously discussed, a corporate defendant may have per-
fectly legitimate reasons for wishing the information to remain
private, and interests in the continued validity, finality and reliability
of protective orders.
Under the approach apparently now sanctioned by a number
of courts, if the requirements of Rule 26(c) and Rule 11 are applied
literally, the corporate defendant, as the protected party, must, at
the conclusion of the case, wade through all the discovery produced,
document-by-document. The defendant must then show good cause
why each individual document still warrants protection. Given the
strictures of Rule 11 and the requirement of reasonable inquiry, 29°
such a document-by-document investigation could impose substan-
tial costs and hours or even weeks of labor on the defendant,
followed by considerable effort by the court, extending many years
after the litigation is resolved.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
has taken a far more practical approach to post-trial applications to
set aside protective orders. In Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co.,29 '
the court was confronted with an application by the Washington Post
and a non-party (the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press) for access to some 3800 pages of deposition testimony and
425 pages of accompanying exhibits generated during a libel action
brought against the Post by the president of Mobil Corporation and
his son. The documents in question involved Mobil's dealings in
Saudi Arabia and its marine transport business, and were all subject
to an umbrella protective order entered some five years earlier. 292
always assert that the passage of time had obviated the need for continuing protection. Thus,
a good argument can be made that courts should apply this approach only to the initial
determination of whether to enter a protective order. Marcus, supra note 2, at 28 n.117.
"9 In the Agent Orange case, for example, the magistrate referred to the dated nature of
the discovery materials at issue (20 to 30 years old) as an "important factor in determining
whether disclosure will cause competitive harm." In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
104 F.R.D. 559, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953
(1987). See also Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 118 F.R.D. 511 (D. Kan.), vacated on other grounds,
851 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1988).
29° See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule I I.
291 111 F.R.D. 653 (D,D.C. 1986), on remand from 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir.), vacating 724
F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984) for reconsideration in light of Seattle Times.
2" Id. at 654.
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In light of the post-trial application to set aside the protective order,
Mobil conducted a generalized renewed evaluation of the materials
and submitted an affidavit of counsel in support of its position that
the order was still needed so as not to affect adversely its position
with Saudi Arabia. The Post, however, asserted that a document-by-
document and line-by-line inspection of the materials and testimony
was necessary to meet the burden imposed on Mobil by Rule 26(c).
The Post also argued that the information was substantially in the
public domain, and that because it involved commercial events more
than ten years old, it was stale. 2"
The court agreed that the burden remained on Mobil to make
a "present determination" of good cause, but flatly rejected its claim
that intense scrutiny of the materials was needed in a matter already
tried to a conclusion. 294 Instructing that Rule 26(c) should be con-
strued so as to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action, the court declined to "undertake that which
it ha[d] already stated it had no intention of undertaking: a time-
consuming review of the [voluminous discovery documents]." 296 Be-
cause the Post had already obtained the full benefit of the discovery
materials for trial preparation, and the material was no longer
needed for trial, the court concluded that "such an undertaking
would be a waste of the parties' and the Court's resources." 296 The
court further specifically ruled that the lawyer's affidavit, though it
did not meet the standard of particularity that would have been
required to justify the initial entry of an umbrella protective order
on a contested motion, satisfied its burden of showing good cause
for maintaining the umbrella order that had been in place for
several years. 297
The standards for modification of umbrella protective orders
should not be lessened. Further, Rule 26(c) should not be inter-
preted so as to impose on parties and the system itself a never-
ending responsibility to monitor discovery records and proceedings
as if the materials and information were comparable to presidential
papers or state secrets with significant historic value to our democ-
295 See id. at 655-57.
"U' Id. at 659.
295 Id.
298 Id.
297 Id. at 659-60; see also Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House
Group, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 269,268 (M.D.N.C, 1988) ("To the extent that a party has relied on
[a) protective order for a significant period of time, [a] (c]ourt may require a reduced showing
of good cause in order to continue with a protective order.").
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racy. Placing such an onerous burden on the products liability de-
fendant—particularly in complex products liability cases—not only
fails "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination" of
every action required by Rule 1, but also runs afoul of the ever-
pressing need, in an age of shrinking budgets, to manage the courts'
dockets in a way that will produce reasonable access to the judicial
system for all members of society.
Vii. CONCLUSION
Protective orders are, at least ostensibly, intended to protect
parties subject to the extremely liberal rules of discovery in civil
litigation from the irreparable harm that can accompany the pub-
lication of proprietary, confidential business information and trade
secrets. Increasingly, however, this protection is being eroded by
courts that, succumbing to pressures from the public and the press,
have allowed private dispute resolution to be turned into a media
event, and by a plaintiff's bar that has made a business out of selling
information obtained in discovery to other potential adversaries.
These courts, rather than concerning themselves with the efficient
resolution of the private dispute before them, seem to assume that
litigation has a legislative function and that lawsuits are akin to
freedom of information requests. Despite Supreme Court decisions
that plainly confirm that there is no right of access—constitutional
or otherwise—to confidential pretrial discovery information, defen-
dants, particularly those in products liability cases, continue to face
successful challenges to protective orders from many fronts. 298
Recent lower court cases recognizing a presumptive public right
of access to discovery materials, and imposing on defendants a
never-ending obligation to show "good cause" for maintaining con-
fidentiality through a document-by-document review of the infor-
mation produced, may preclude future use of stipulated protective
orders. Those who seek protection are left with a motion for a
protective order as their only recourse. Because the burden of
establishing a record sufficient for entry of a protective order on
298 Legislation has been discussed at both the state and federal level that would modify
Rule 26(c) and similar state rules to restrict the use of protective orders. For example, one
bill considered by some federal legislators would bar courts From issuing orders that preclude
disclosure to a federal agency of information relating to product safety. The danger of such
legislation, if enacted, should be clear from the foregoing discussion. Such an amendment
to Rule 26(c), in addition, would undoubtedly spawn "satellite hearings" regarding a deter-
mination of the "public interest" and offer plaintiffs the chance to obtain confidential doc-
uments from a prior similar case that may not even be discoverable in a current action.
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motion is difficult, information that previously would have been
quickly disclosed will now be disclosed only after lengthy and hotly
contested evidentiary hearings at which confidentiality is dis-
puted. 299
 Moreover, parties subject to discovery requests will try to
persuade courts to deny discovery altogether, because once infor-
mation is produced, no order can adequately protect its confiden-
tiality.m° Eliminating the blanket protective order assures ever more
aggressive and frequent arguments over discovery requests, under-
mining the goals of Rule l. 301
The trend toward restricting the use of protective orders, evi-
dent in so many recent cases and some state legislation, is likely to
impede settlements at the same time that the facilitation of settle-
ments is increasingly being recognized as "a legitimate and desirable
goal for courts to pursue."3 D 2 At least one court has noted, "that the
need for trial frequently disappears once both sides have a full and
complete understanding of the facts . . . .""3
 When parties can no
longer rely upon protective orders as a tool to facilitate full and
complete disclosure of relevant confidential information, the settle-
ment of cases will be delayed or prevented simply because the
parties will be delayed in assembling the factual basis for intelligent
settlement discussion. Moreover, any trial attorney knows that con-
fidentiality orders, whether with respect to the terms of the settle-
ment itself or with respect to information disclosed during the
litigation, often form part of the consideration for the settlement.
It is not only defendants who look for that type of consideration;
plaintiffs often look for it as well, whether to avoid embarrassment
299 See generally, Marcus, supra note 2, at 21-22.
so° Id. at 21; see, e.g., Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 482 n.22 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (declining to enter protective order restraining plaintiff's disclosure of matters already
obtained in discovery but stating that "the penchant of the plaintiff to try her case in the
media may become a consideration in determining the scope of discovery to be afforded
her"); see also In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1981) ("If the trial judge
were required to allow virtually full publicity of utterances forced from the mouth of an
unwilling deponent .. . he might well refuse to allow the discovery to proceed at all .. . .").
551 See, e.g., Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash..2d 226, 254, 654 P.2d 673, 689
(1982) (noting that parties who are not assured that the information they give will be used
only for litigation may be "tempted to withhold information and even to shade the truth,
where otherwise they would not do so"); see also Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260,
264 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964).
302 Marcus, supra note 2, at 27. See generally Marcus, supra note 2, at 27-28. The 1983
amendment to Rule 16 explicitly directs that the pretrial hearing should include a discussion
of "the possibility of settlement." See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 97 F.R.D. 165, 170
(1983).
"3
 Krause v. Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212, 214 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982).
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or harassment over the terms of the settlement or to prevent dis-
closure of embarrassing personal information that came out over
the course of the litigation. If parties cannot assume with confidence
that their protective orders are reasonably secure from collateral
attack, settlement will be made more difficult for the simple reason
that the parties will have been denied flexibility in what they can
ask for or give by way of consideration. With fewer cases settling
and more cases going to trial, the strain on already overcrowded
court dockets will be further increased, and the goals of the Rules
will be further undermined."4
The recent trend towards restricting the use of protective or-
ders is already changing the face of complex litigation. The um-
brella protective order, a standard in multidistrict and complex
products liability litigation, once provided a guarantee of protection
with relative ease of administration. Now, defendants in such cases
must increasingly confront the document-specific protective order.
This is a costly and time consuming mechanism for safeguarding
defendants' information and one that may now be reviewable by
motion of any member of the public, at any time. Such a protective
order not only undermines the spirit of Rule 1, but also offers the
producing party no real protection at all. Far from functioning as
a safeguard, the term "protective order" may rapidly be becoming
a misnomer.
5" See Marcus, supra note 2, at 28. Courts, however, generally have not been willing to
recognize this problem. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987) (rejecting defendant's argument that unsealing order
improperly altered a term of the settlement agreement, stating that the existence of the
protective order was not integral to the settlement in that case); see also Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussed at supra note 144);
United States v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 124 F.R.D. 146, 153 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
